The Summa of Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas volume 1
On the first point, two subjects of research: the soul in itself (Q. 75), and in its union with the body (Q. 76). On the first subject, seven questions:
1. Is the soul a corporeal reality? -
2. Is it a subsisting reality? -
3. Are the souls of beasts subsisting? -
4. Is the soul man himself, or rather is man a being composed of soul and body? -
5. Is the soul composed of matter and form? -
6. Is she incorruptible? -
7. Is she of the same nature as the angel?
Article 1 — Is the soul a corporeal reality?
Objections:
1. The soul is the principle of movement for the body. If she gives it, it is because she received it. It is true of all reality: we do not give what we do not have, what is not hot does not heat up. In the case of a being which gives movement without having received any, there would be eternal and uniform movement, according to Aristotle's demonstration. But nothing of the sort appears in the movement which comes from the soul. Therefore the soul gives movement because it has received it; and since every such reality is a body, the soul is consequently a corporeal reality.
2. All knowledge occurs through the mediation of a certain similarity of the object. However, there cannot be a resemblance between a body and an incorporeal reality. The soul could therefore not know bodies if it did not have the same nature.
3. The moving cause must have contact with what it moves. Now there is contact only between bodies. Therefore, if the soul sets the body in motion, it is a corporeal reality.
In the opposite sense , according to S. Augustine, we say that the soul is simple if we compare it to the body, because it does not spread through its mass in space.
Answer:
To find out what the nature of the soul is, we must begin by admitting that the soul is the first principle of life in the living things that surround us, because we call the living "animate" and "inanimate objects." , beings who do not have life. However, life manifests itself above all through knowledge and movement. The ancient philosophers, incapable of going beyond imagination, attributed a corporeal principle to these actions: for them there were no other realities than bodies; outside there was nothing. Also they affirmed that the soul is a bodily reality.
The falsity of this opinion could be shown in many ways, but we will use a single argument, both the most universal and the surest.
Every principle of vital operation is not a soul, or else the eye, principle of vision would be a soul, and so of the other organs. But it is the first vital principle which is a soul. A body may well be in some way a vital principle - the heart for example - but not the first principle. If a body is a vital principle, it is not as a body - otherwise every body would be - but because it is such a body. Now it has such actuality because of a principle which is called its act. Since the soul is the first principle of life, it is therefore not a bodily reality, but the act of a body. Likewise, heat, the principle of action by which one body heats another, is not a body, but the act of a body.
Solutions:
1. Every being in motion receives its movement, it is true; but, since we cannot go back to infinity, it is necessary that there be a cause of movement which does not receive any. To be set in motion is to move from potential to action: the moving cause gives to the mobile what it has, insofar as it actualizes it. But Aristotle distinguishes a completely immobile moving cause, which receives no movement either by nature or indirectly; such a cause can produce perpetual and uniform motion. Then another cause which is not set in motion by itself, - per se - but only indirectly, - per accidentens -, this one does not produce perpetual and uniform movement; this is the case with the soul. Finally another cause to which it belongs by nature to be moved, like the body. The ancient "physicists", who believed only in the existence of bodies, affirmed that every motive cause receives its movement, that this is necessary in the case of the soul, and therefore what is a corporeal reality.
2. It is not required that the resemblance of the known reality be actual in the knowing being. But if a being is first potentially, then in the act of knowing, it is sufficient for it to be potentially in the resemblance of the thing known, without it possessing it in act; thus color is not in action in the pupil of the eye. Consequently, it is not necessary that the resemblance of corporeal realities be actual in the soul, but that the soul be in the power to receive it. - The ancient "physicists", who did not distinguish between potency and act, assumed that the soul had a corporeal nature, composed of the elements of all bodies to be capable of knowing them all.
3. We distinguish between contact by quantity and contact by action. In the first case, a body can only be touched by a body; in the second, it can be by an immaterial reality which moves it.
Article 2 — Is the soul a subsisting reality?
Objections:
1.For this to happen it would have to be able to be designated as “something”. Now this designation is only suitable for the compound of soul and body.
2 . An activity can be attributed to a subsisting reality. Now, we cannot do it for the soul. Because, according to Aristotle, if we said that the soul feels or understands, we could just as easily say that it weaves or builds.
3 . Furthermore, this would imply that it has a certain activity independently of the body, whereas this is not true, even of the intellectual act for which images, phenomena of bodily origin, are always required.
On the contrary , according to S. Augustine "when we understand that the spirit is by nature a substance, but not corporeal, we understand the error of those who consider it corporeal: they add elements to it without which they are incapable of conceiving any nature, namely the images of bodies.” The nature of the human spirit is therefore firstly incorporeal, but moreover it is substance, that is to say subsisting reality.
Answer:
The principle of the intellectual act which we call human soul must be an incorporeal and subsisting principle. Through intelligence, in fact, man can know all corporeal natures. But to know objects, one must not possess anything in oneself about their nature; because what one would thus possess by essence would prevent one from knowing other realities. Thus, the tongue of the patient, charged with a bitter, bilious humor, tastes nothing sweet, but finds everything bitter. Therefore, if the intellectual principle possessed within it any corporeal nature, it could not know all bodies: every body is in fact of a determinate nature. It is therefore impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body.
And it is equally impossible for him to know by means of a bodily organ. Because the nature of this specific organ would prevent us from knowing all bodies, what a color would do in the pupil of the eye. Likewise, a liquid takes on the color of the glass where it is poured.
The intellectual principle - in other words the mind, the intelligence - therefore possesses by itself an activity in which the body has no part. But nothing can act by itself that does not exist by itself. For only being in action acts; consequently a being only operates in the manner in which it exists. So we do not say that what heats is heat, but what is hot. It remains that the human soul, that is to say the intelligence, the spirit, is an incorporeal and subsisting reality.
Solutions:
1.We can understand “something” either of any subsisting reality, or of a complete subsisting reality, of a determinate kind. The first sense excludes everything which is accident, or material form, the second excludes again this imperfection of being a part of a whole. Thus the hand is "something" in the first sense, but not in the second. In the same way the soul, which is a part of human nature, is "something", a subsisting reality, only in the first sense. This is why it must be conceded that the compound of soul and body can be designated as "something".
2. The text cited does not report Aristotle's thought, but the opinion of those for whom understanding is being set in motion: we can see this from the context. - Another answer: it is appropriate for what exists by itself to act by itself. But we can say of a thing that it subsists by itself when it is neither accident nor material form, even though it would only be a part of a being. But strictly speaking, there is nothing subsisting in itself except the thing which is neither accident, nor material form, nor part. In this sense, we cannot say that the eye or the hand subsist in themselves, and consequently that they have an activity of their own. It is to the whole that the operations of the parts are attributed, considered as a means of action. It will indeed be said that man sees with the eye, and feels with the hand; but, in another sense, that the hot object warms by its heat. Because, strictly speaking, heat does not heat in any way. We will therefore say that the soul thinks, as we say that the eye sees, but it would be more accurate to say: man thinks through his soul.
3. The body is not required for the intellectual act in the manner of an organ, but because of the object it gives it: the image, which is to the intelligence what color is in sight5. The fact of needing the body does not prevent intelligence from being subsistent; otherwise the animal would not be, he who needs external objects for sensation.
Article 3 — Are the souls of beasts subsistent?
Objections:
1. It looks good. Indeed, man, whose soul is a subsisting reality, belongs to the same genus as animals.
2. There is the same relationship between the senses and sensible data as between intelligence and intelligible data. However, intelligence does without the body to apprehend intelligible realities. So the same thing will happen to the senses. The soul of beasts which possesses senses will therefore subsist, for the same reason as the human soul endowed with intelligence.
3. The soul of beasts moves their body. But a body does not move: it is moved. Therefore the soul of beasts has a certain activity independently of the body.
In the opposite direction, we read in the book of Dogmas of the Church: "We believe that only man has a subsisting soul, but this is not true of animals."
Answer:
The ancient philosophers made no difference between meaning and intelligence. As has already been said, they related both faculties to a bodily principle. Plato admitted that they were distinct, but he related both to an incorporeal principle, affirming that understanding and feeling were proper to the soul. Consequently, the souls of beasts had to be subsisting. But Aristotle affirmed that intellection, alone among the activities of the soul, is accomplished without a bodily organ. As for sensation and other activities of the sensitive soul, it is clear that they involve bodily modification; thus, in vision, the pupil is modified by the colored representation; it is the same for the other powers. The sensitive soul therefore has no operation which suits it of its own, but all its activity comes from the compound. The soul of beasts, having no activity of its own, cannot be subsistent because every being exists in the manner in which it acts.
Solutions:
1. Although man is of the same genus as animals, he nevertheless differs from them by species. It is the difference in form which causes the specific difference. But it is not necessary that every difference in form makes the gender different.
2. The analogy between sense and intelligence is based on the fact that they are both potentially related to their objects. But they are dissimilar, due to the fact that the sense undergoes the action of the sensitive given with a bodily modification. Also objects of too great intensity can be damaging to the senses. This does not happen in the intelligence which, after having grasped the most elevated objects of thought, is more apt to grasp lesser ones. However, if the body becomes tired while we think, this is an indirect effect, inasmuch as the intelligence needs the operation of the sensitive faculties which provide it with images.
3. There are two faculties in the soul which relate to movement: one controls movement, it is appetite. In the sensitive soul, it cannot act without the body: anger, joy and all passions imply a bodily modification. The other motor faculty executes the movement. by it, the members are enabled to follow the impulse of the appetite. Its operation does not consist of moving, but of being moved. From which we can conclude that there is no movement in the sensitive soul which is executed without the body.
Article 4 — Is the soul man himself?
Objections:
1.It is written (2 Cor 4:16): “Though our outward self corrupts, our inward self is renewed day by day.” What is within is the soul. The soul is therefore the inner man.
2. The human soul is a substance, not universal, but individual. It is therefore a hypostasis, a person, and moreover, a human person. The soul is therefore man, since the human person is man.
On the contrary , S. Augustine praises Varro for having recognized that “man is neither only the body, nor only the soul, but both the soul and the body”.
Answer:
We can understand in two ways that the soul is man. First in the sense that man in general would be the soul, while this particular man would not be the soul, but a composite of soul and body, thus Socrates. And if I express myself this way, it is because certain philosophers have admitted that form alone belongs to the species, matter being a part of the individual and not of the species. But this cannot be true, since everything designated by the definition belongs to the species. And the definition of physical beings does not only designate form*, but matter*. Also, in these beings, matter is a part of the species, not matter which has a determined quantity, and which is the principle of individuation*, but common matter. For example, it is of the essence of this particular man that he is constituted by this soul, this flesh and these bones, while it is of the essence of man in general to have a soul, flesh and bones. For everything that is common in essence to all the individuals contained in a species necessarily belongs to the substance of the species.
We can still understand the thesis in another way: “this soul” would be identical to “this man”. We could say so if the activity of the sensitive soul was specific to it independently of the body. All the activities that we attribute to man would then only suit the soul. Each reality is that which acts. So a man is the very thing that produces the actions of man. - But we have previously shown that sensation is not an operation of the soul alone. Feeling is an operation of the whole man, although it is not specific to man. Consequently, man is not only the soul, but a being composed of soul and body. Plato, for whom sensation was an operation specific to the soul, could say that man is "a soul which uses a body".
Solutions:
1.Aristotle wrote that a thing is above all what is principal in it. When the leader of the city does something, it is attributed to the city itself. So sometimes we designate by the term man what is most important in him, sometimes the intellectual part, - what is consistent with the truth, - and this is "the inner man" ; sometimes the sensitive part, including the body, - according to the opinion of the philosophers who stopped at the level of the sensitive, - and this is "the external man".
2. Every individual substance is not a hypostasis, a person, but only that which possesses the specific essence in full. Neither hand nor foot can be called hypostasis or person. Likewise the soul, which is only a part of the human species.
Article 5 — Is the soul composed of matter and form?
Objections:
1. Power is opposed to the act. All beings in action participate in the first act, God, through whom all things have goodness, being, life, as Dionysius teaches. Therefore everything that is in potential participates in the first power, which is the first matter. Now, the human soul is in potential in a certain respect: this is seen in the potential state in which intelligence is sometimes found. The human soul therefore participates in the raw material, which partly constitutes it.
2. There is matter wherever the properties of matter meet. Now, there are material properties in the soul such as being subject and changing. The soul is the subject of science and virtue; it passes from ignorance to science, from vice to virtue. There is therefore matter in the soul.
3. That which has no matter, has no cause of its being, says Aristotle. But the soul has a cause, since it is created by God. It therefore has a material.
4. That which has no matter, being only form, is pure and infinite act. But that belongs to God alone. The soul therefore has matter.
In the opposite sense , S. Augustine establishes that the soul was not made of any matter, neither corporeal nor spiritual.
Answer :
The soul has no matter. This can first be proven from the concept of soul in general, according to which the soul is the form of a body. But then it is form, either through its entire reality or through a part of itself. In the first hypothesis, the soul cannot have matter, if by that we mean being which is only potentially; for the form, as such, is an act, and that which is only potentially cannot be part of an act, since the potentiality cannot coincide with the act, being its opposite. But if the soul is only formed by a part of itself, this part we will call soul, and the matter of which it is immediately the act we will call the "first animated".
We can also prove that the soul has no matter based on the concept of the human soul, considered intellectual. It is obvious that every being is received into another according to the mode of the one who receives it. Thus, all reality is known according to whether its form exists in the knowing being. The intellectual soul knows reality in its essence, in an absolute mode, for example stone qua stone. The form of the stone is therefore found in the intellectual soul, in an absolute mode, according to its formal reason alone. The intellectual soul is therefore an absolute form (that is to say freed from matter), and not a compound of matter and form. If, on the contrary, it were a compound, the form of realities would be received in it as they are individual; and in this way, the soul would only know the singular, in the manner of sensitive faculties, which receive the form of realities in a bodily organ. Matter, in fact, is the principle of individuation of forms. It therefore remains that the intellectual soul, and indeed any other substance endowed with intelligence, and knowing the form of realities in an absolute mode, is not composed of form and matter
Solutions:
1.The First Act is the universal principle of all acts, because it is and contains virtually within itself all reality, according to Dionysius. If he is participated by other beings, it is not because he is part of them, but it is to the extent that beings proceed from him through a sort of diffusion of his plenitude. As for the power, it must be proportionate to the act, since it receives it. The acts received, which proceed from the first infinite act and are a participation in it, are diverse. There cannot therefore be a single power which receives all acts, just as there is a single act which gives being to all participated acts; or else the receiving power would be equal to the active power of the first act. But the receptive power found in the intellectual soul is of another order than that of raw matter. This is evident from the diversity of forms received in one or the other, because raw matter receives individual forms and intelligence, universal forms. The existence of a power of this kind in the intellectual soul does not therefore prove that the soul is composed of matter and form.
2. It is appropriate for matter to be subject and to change, because it is in potential. Intelligence and raw matter, not being in the same potential, differ in their way of being subject and of changing. Intelligence is the subject of science, and passes from ignorance to science, insofar as it is capable of intelligible forms.
3. What causes the existence of matter is form. He is also the agent. By the fact that the agent brings matter into action, into the act of form, he is the cause of its existence. But a form which subsists by itself does not possess existence by virtue of some formal principle distinct from it; nor does it have a cause which causes it to pass from potentiality to action. Following the text cited in the objection, the Philosopher concludes that, in beings composed of matter and form, "there is no other cause than that which causes the passage from potency to act but immaterial beings are immediately a true being.
4.The participated being is with that which participates in it in the relationship of the act to the power. Every created form, even if it subsists in itself, must participate in being. This is true, according to Dionysius, of life itself, or of any other similar modality. However, being participated is limited by the capacity of the receiving subject. Consequently, God alone, who is his very being, is pure and unlimited act. But, in intelligent substances, there is a composition of act and power; not composition of matter and form, but of form and being participated. This is why some philosophers say that they are composed of “that by which they are” and of “what they are”: being is in fact “that by which” a reality exists.
Article 6 — Is the human soul incorruptible?
Objections:
1. Beings who have the same origin and the same development must have a similar end. Men and beasts have the same origin, since they come from the earth. And the development of their life is identical: because, according to Ecclesiastes (3, 19), "all living things have the same breath, and man has nothing more than the animal." Consequently, adds he says, "death is the same for both, and their fate is equal." Since the soul of beasts is corruptible, the human soul is therefore also.
2 . What comes from nothing must return to nothing, because the end must be proportionate to the beginning. Now, it is said in the book of Wisdom (2, 2 Vg): “We were born of nothing”, which is true of the body, but of the soul too. Therefore "after this life it will be as if we had not existed", even in relation to the soul.
3. No reality exists that does not have its own activity. For the soul, this activity, which is to understand with the help of images, cannot exist without the body. The soul cannot know intellectually without images, and images cannot be given if there is no body, says Aristotle. The soul cannot therefore subsist once the body is destroyed.
In the opposite sense , human souls, says Dionysius, derive from divine goodness an “intellectual nature and a subsisting and imperishable life”.
Answer :
The human soul, which we affirm is the principle of thought, must be incorruptible. A thing, in fact, can be corrupted either by itself or by the corruption of something other than itself. Now, a subsisting reality cannot be generated or corrupted in the second way, that is, because another being is generated or becomes corrupted. Generation and corruption in fact suit a thing in the manner in which being suits it, which is acquired by one and lost by the other. The thing to which being is suited by itself can only be generated or corrupted by reason of its own nature; but what does not subsist, like accidents and material forms, is born and disappears at the same time as the compound to which it belongs. - We have seen that the soul of beasts is not subsistent by nature, but only the human soul. Also the soul of beasts is destroyed along with the bodies.
As for the human soul, it could not be corrupted otherwise than by corrupting itself. Now this is completely impossible, not only for it, but for any subsisting reality which is pure form. Indeed, what is inherently appropriate to a thing is inseparable from it. Now being agrees of itself with form, which is an act. Matter only receives actual being because it receives form. If it corrupts, it is because the form separates from it. But it is impossible for the form to be separated from itself. A subsisting form cannot therefore cease to exist.
Even if the soul were composed of matter and form, according to the opinion of some, it would still be necessary to assert that it is incorruptible. There is in fact corruption only in beings where there is a transition from one opposite to another. Generations and corruptions are the transitions from certain states to their opposites. Celestial bodies whose matter is not subject to contrariety are incorruptible. But in the intellectual soul there can be no contrariety. When she receives, it is according to the nature of her being. But what is thus received does not present any contrariety. For even the ideas of opposites are not opposed in it, and there is only the same science of opposites. The human soul cannot therefore be corruptible.
We can find proof of this incorruptibility in this general truth: every being naturally desires to exist, in the mode that suits it. Among beings endowed with knowledge, desire is proportionate to the mode of knowing. Sense only knows being in a concrete extent and duration, but intelligence knows it absolutely, and with reference to any time. Also, every being endowed with intelligence naturally desires to always exist. But a natural desire cannot be in vain. Any intelligent substance is therefore incorruptible.
Solutions:
1.Solomon attributes this idea to fools, as we can see in the book of Wisdom (2, 1-21). That man and animals have the same origin is true with regard to the body; all animals actually come from the earth. But this is no longer true of the soul; the soul of beasts is produced by bodily energy, but the human soul by God. Genesis (1, 24) will say, regarding beasts: "Let the earth produce the soul of the living", but regarding man (2, 7): God "breathed on his face the breath of life "Hence this word from Ecclesiastes (12, 7): "Let the dust return to the earth from which it was taken and the spirit return to God who gave it." vital development is identical, with regard to the body. The text of Ecclesiastes (3, 19) refers to this: “All living have the same breath”; and that of Wisdom (2, 2): "It is a smoke and a breath in our nostrils..." But the development is not the same in the case of the soul: man has the intelligence, animals have none. It is therefore false to say: "Man has nothing more than the animal." Also, the end of one and that of the other is the same for the body, not for the soul.
2. Creating proceeds, not from a passive power, but from the only active power of the Creator who can make something out of nothing. Thus, being able to return to nothingness does not imply that the creature has the ability to no longer exist, but means that the Creator has the power to no longer give it being. Now to be corruptible is to have this ability to no longer exist.
3. Thinking with images is the proper operation of the soul which is united to the body. When it is separated from it, it will have a different way of knowing, analogous to that of other separated substances, as we will see more clearly later.
Article 7 - Is the soul of the same nature as the angel?
Objection:
1. Every being is oriented to its end by the nature of its species, which gives it an inclination towards this end. The soul and the angel have the same end, eternal bliss. They are therefore of the same species.
2. The last specific difference is the most perfect in being, because it is this which completes the essence of the species. But nothing is more perfect in the angel and in the soul than the intellectual being. They thus have the same specific difference, they are therefore of the same species.
3. The soul only appears to differ from the angel by its union with the body. This is not a part of the essence of the soul; it therefore does not belong to its species. Therefore the soul and the angel are of the same species.
In the opposite direction, beings whose own activities are different belong to different species. This is the case for the soul and for the angel. According to Dionysius: "Angelic spirits possess a simple and happy intelligence, because they do not borrow their knowledge of divinity from the visible world." He then asserts the opposite about the human soul. The soul and the angel therefore do not belong to the same species.
Answer:
Origen admitted the identity of species for human souls and for angels; for he recognized only an accidental difference in their degree of perfection, caused, as previously stated, by their free choice.
But this is impossible, because the incorporeal substances cannot be distinguished numerically from one another without a difference of species and without a natural inequality. Not being composed of matter and form, but being subsisting forms, they must be distinguished by species. It is inconceivable that a separate form is not unique to each species. If there were a whiteness separated from any subject, it would necessarily be unique; thus one whiteness is only distinguished from another because it is found in this or that subject. Diversity in the species is always accompanied by natural inequality.
Thus, among the species of colors, one is more perfect than the other, and it is the same elsewhere. The reason is that the differences that divide gender are opposites; but the opposites have between them the relationship of the perfect to the imperfect, because "the principle of opposition by contrariety is privation and possession", according to Aristotle.
The consequence would be the same if the incorporeal substances were composed of matter and form. To distinguish one matter from another, either the form will have to be the principle of distinction for the matter; that is to say, the materials will be diverse by their relation to various forms, and then there will still be a diversity of species and a natural inequality. Either matter will have to be the principle of distinction of forms, and in this case one matter will only be distinguished from another according to the divisions of quantity; but we do not find them in incorporeal substances such as the angel and the soul. It is therefore impossible that the angel and the soul are of the same species. We will show later how human souls are several in a single species.
Solutions:
1. This argument considers the imminent and natural end of a being, while the eternal beatitude of spirits is a final and supernatural end.
2.The ultimate specific difference is the most perfect in being, because it is the most determined, in the way that the act is more perfect than the power. But “intellectual” is not what is most perfect in this sense; for it is indeterminate and universal in relation to many degrees of intellectuality, just as "sensible" is in relation to the many degrees of sensitive being. Consequently, since sentient beings do not all belong to the same species, neither do all intellectual beings.
3. The body is not part of the essence of the soul, but the soul is, by its essence, capable of being united with the body. Also it is not the soul, strictly speaking, which belongs to the species, but the compound. And the very fact that the soul, in some way, needs the body to act shows that it is an intellectual nature of a lower degree than that of the angel, who is never united to a body.