The Summa of Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas volume 1
We must, logically, deal with Persons in particular. And first of all about the person of the Father:
1. Is it appropriate for the Father to be described as “Principle”?
2. Is the name “Father” the proper name of this Person?
3. Is it, in God, a personal name before being an attribute of the essence?
4. Is it proper for the Father to be unbegotten?
Article 1 — Is it appropriate for the Father to be described as “Principle”?
Objections:
1. It cannot be said that the Father is “principle” of the Son or of the Holy Spirit. Because principle and cause are all one, according to the Philosopher. Now, we do not say that the Father is the cause of the Son. So we should not say that it is the principle either.
2. To every principle there is a term which depends on it. Therefore, if the Father is the principle of the Son, it follows that the Son depends on the Father, consequently that he is created. Obvious error.
3 . The name “principle” is based on a property. Now, according to S. Athanasius, there is neither before nor after in God. We must therefore not use this term “principle” in relation to divine persons.
On the contrary , S. Augustine says that “the Father is the principle of all deity.”
Answer:
The word “principle” simply means: that from which something proceeds. Everything, in fact, from which another proceeds in any way whatsoever, takes the name of principle, and vice versa. And since the Father is one from whom another proceeds, it follows that he is Principle.
Solutions:
1. The Greeks use the terms “cause” and “principle” interchangeably when it comes to God; but the Latin Doctors avoid the term “cause” and only use that of “principle”. Here's why. “Principle” is more general than “cause”, this word itself being more general than “element”: we say, in fact, that the first term or even the first part of a thing are its principle, but not the cause. Now, the more general a name is, the more suitable it is to be transposed into God, as we have said; because the more names become specialized, the more they determine the mode specific to the creature. In fact, the name “cause” evokes a diversity of substance and a dependence of the effect on the cause, which the name “principle” does not evoke: whatever the type of causality, there is always, between the cause and its effect, a sort of distance in perfection or virtue. But the term “principle” is used even when there is no difference of this kind; it is enough that we discern an order. We say that the point is the principle of the line, or that the first part of the line is the principle.
2. Among Greek authors, we find passages where it is said that the Son or the Holy Spirit “depend on their principle”; but this expression is not accepted among our doctors. If, by giving the Father the name of Principle, we recognize in him a sort of “authority”, at least we are careful not to give the Son or the Holy Spirit any qualification which even slightly suggests subjection or inferiority: this, to avoid any opportunity for error. The same concern inspired S. Hilaire, when he said: “By his authority as Giver, the Father is greater; but the Son is no less great, he who receives as a gift the very being of the Father. ”
3. It is true that the word “principle”, considering its etymology, seems to come from a priority, however it does not mean priority but origin. Let's not confuse the meaning of a word with its etymology, as we said above.
Article 2 — Is the name “Father” the proper name of this Person?
Objections:
1. The name “father” signifies a relationship, whereas the person is an individual substance: “Father” is therefore not a proper name of a person.
2 . Furthermore, “he who begets” is a more general designation than “father”; because every father generates, but the converse is not true. Now, the more general name is more properly suited to naming God, as we have seen. So “He who begets, the Progenitor” would be more proper names than “the Father” to designate a divine Person.
3 . A figurative noun cannot be someone's proper name. Now it is by metaphor that we qualify our verb as “begotten”, “fruit”; also metaphorically, as a result, we call the principle of the verb “father”. In God, therefore, the Principle of the Word cannot be called Father in the literal sense.
4 . Everything that is said about God himself is verified by him primarily, and by the creature secondarily. However, it seems on the contrary that the notion of generation applies primarily to the creature and not to God: is there not, in fact, more truly generation when the fruit is distinguished from its principle not by simple relationship, but by its very essence? Therefore the name “father” which is based on generation, is not properly suited to a divine Person.
On the contrary , we read in the Psalm (89,27): “He will call on me: You are my Father.”
Answer :
A person's proper name means what distinguishes them from everyone else. Indeed, just as the definition of man includes a soul and a body, so, according to Aristotle, the definition of “such a man” includes such a soul and such a body; that is to say, the very thing which distinguishes this man from all others. Now, what distinguishes the person of the Father from others is paternity. The proper name of this Person is therefore that of Father, which signifies paternity.
Solutions:
1. In us, the relationship is not a subsisting person; also, when it comes to us, the name “father” does not mean the person, but a relation of the person. In God, it is otherwise, whatever certain theologians have thought, who have erred on this point: the relationship signified by the name “Father” is a subsisting person. Indeed, we have said that in God the word “person” signifies the relationship as subsisting in the divine nature.
2 . According to the Philosopher, we should preferably name reality after that which makes it perfect and complete. Now “generation” means the process in its very becoming, while “paternity” means the perfect completion of generation. This is why the name “Father” is preferable to those of “Progenitor” or “Begetter”, as the name of a divine person.
3. Our word is not something subsisting in human nature; we cannot therefore properly qualify him as begotten, nor as a son. On the other hand, the divine Word is a reality subsisting in the divine nature; also it is properly and not by figure that we give him the name “Son”, and to his Principle the name “Father”.
4. The terms “generation” and “paternity” like the other names which are attributed to God in the literal sense, are more truly appropriate to God than to creatures, at least when considering the reality signified, and not the mode of signification. Also the Apostle says (Eph 3, 14. 15): “I bow my knees before the Father of my Lord Jesus Christ, from whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth takes its name. ” Here is why: it is clear that generation is specified by its term, which is the form of the begotten; and the closer this form comes to the begetter, the more there will be true and perfect generation; thus univocal generation is more perfect than equivocal generation. This is because, by definition, the begetter generates a being which is similar to him according to form. Therefore, the very fact that, in divine generation, there is numerical identity of form between begetter and begotten, while in creatures there is only specific identity without numerical identity, this itself shows that generation and paternity is verified in God more perfectly than in creatures. And if, in God, there is only a relative distinction between the begetter and the begotten, this brings out the truth of this generation and this paternity.
Article 3 - Does the name “Father”, said of God, primarily mean personal property?
Objections:
1. Logically, the common term is presupposed to the proper term. Now, the name “Father”, taken in the personal sense, is specific to the person of the Father; taken as an essential attribute, it is common to the whole Trinity: for it is to the whole Trinity that we say: “Our Father”. It is therefore as an essential attribute, and not in the personal sense, that this name “Father” is verified first and foremost.
2 . When a name keeps the same definition in its various applications, there is no need to distinguish order or degrees in the attribution. Now, whether it is the divine Person Father of the Son or whether it is the whole Trinity “Our Father” or “Father of creatures”, in both cases we refer to the same notion of paternity. or filiation; because, according to S. Basil, receiving being is a condition common to creatures and to the Son. Consequently, the name Father, in God, is not attributed firstly to the personal sense, and secondarily to the essential sense.
3. It is not possible to compare attributions which, under the same name, do not respond to the same concept. Now, in the epistle to the Colossians (1.15), the Son finds himself brought closer to creatures under this aspect of filiation or generation: “He, the image of the invisible God, the Firstborn of every creature. ”It is therefore the same concept in both cases. In other words, in God, there is no priority of attribution of personal paternity over paternity as an attribute of the essence.
On the contrary , the eternal has priority over the temporal. Now, it is from all eternity that God is Father of his Son; and only in the time that he is Father of the creature. Therefore in God paternity is verified firstly towards the Son, and secondarily towards the creature.
Answer:
An analogical term is suitable firstly for the subject where all the formal reason signified by this term is perfectly realized; then secondarily to the subject where it is partially realized or under a certain aspect; to this last subject, we attribute it by comparison with the one who realizes it perfectly, because the imperfect derives from the perfect. Thus the name “lion” is said first and foremost of the animal, in which all the essence of the lion is realized; it is he who we call lion in the literal sense; then, by derivation, we will give this name to the man in whom we find something of the lion, his audacity or his strength, for example; we call him a lion metaphorically
Now, it clearly emerges from the above that the formal reason for paternity and filiation is found perfect in God the Father and in God the Son, since the Father and the Son have one and the same nature and glory. But, in the creature, if there is filiation in relation to God, it is no longer in the perfect sense, because the Creator and the creature do not have the same nature; there is filiation here only because of a certain similarity between natures. And the more perfect this similarity is, the closer we will come to true filiation. In fact, God is called Father of certain creatures, because of a simple similarity of vestige: this is the case of creatures without reason. According to Job (38:28): “Who is the Father of the rain? Who then created the dewdrops? “There are others of whom God is the Father, because they bear his image: these are rational creatures. “Is not God your Father,” says Deuteronomy (32:6), “he who possessed you, who made you, and who created you? "There are some of whom God is the Father because of this similarity which is grace: these take the name of adopted sons, because the gift of grace which they have received entitles them to the inheritance of eternal glory. According to S. Paul (Rm 8, 16. 17): “The Spirit himself bears witness with our spirit that we are sons of God; and if we are sons, we are also heirs. ” Finally there are some of whom God is the Father because of this similarity which is glory, because they already possess the inheritance of glory, of which S. Paul says (Rm 5, 2): “We let us glory in hope of the glory of the sons of God. ”
It is therefore clear that paternity is attributed to God firstly and mainly in the sense that it evokes the relationship between two divine Persons, and secondarily in the sense that it evokes a relationship of God to the creature.
Solutions:
1. In our thinking, there is logical priority of absolute common attributes over personal properties, because these attributes are involved in the notion of properties, and without reciprocity. Whoever says: the Father, at the same time says: God, without the converse being true. But there is priority of specific attributes evoking personal relationships, over common attributes which indicate relationship to creatures, because the Person proceeding from the innermost part of the divinity also proceeds as the principle of the production of creatures. Indeed, the verb conceived in the artist's thought proceeds from this before the work priority of nature, this is understood, since the work reproduces the conception of the mind. Likewise, the Son proceeds from the Father before the creature to which the name “son” is only attributed to the extent that it receives by participation the likeness of the Son. This is what St. Paul says (Rom 8:29): “Those whom he foreknew, he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son. ”
2. When we say that “receiving” is a condition common to the creature and the Son, it is not a question of univocal community, but of a distant similarity which is enough to give rise to the title of “Firstborn of creatures”. Thus the text already cited, after having said that some would become conformed to the image of the Son of God, adds: “so that he himself may be the firstborn among many brothers.” But he who is naturally the Son of God has over all others this privilege of possessing by nature what he receives, according to the same S. Basil. And for this reason he is called “the only Son”, as we see in St. John 1:18: “The Only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he himself has made known to us. ”
3. The third objection is thus resolved.
Article 4 — Is it proper for the Father to be unbegotten?
Objection:
1. Every property is something positive in the subject to which it belongs. Now the qualification of “unbegotten” poses nothing in the Father; by this, we simply deny that it is generated. It is therefore not a property of the Father.
2 . The term “unengendered” can be understood either as a deprivation or as a pure negation. If it is a negation, everything that is not begotten can be called unbegotten. Now the Holy Spirit is not begotten, nor is the divine essence: the quality of unbegotten therefore also suits them. And therefore, it is not a property of the Father. Is this a deprivation? Every deprivation evokes an imperfection in the subject it affects; it would follow that the person of the Father is imperfect, which is impossible.
3 . In God, “unbegotten” does not mean relation, since it is not a relative predicate; it therefore means substance. Therefore, “unbegotten” and “begotten” evoke a substantial difference. But between the Son, that is to say the Begotten, and the Father, there is no substantial difference. It is therefore that the Father cannot be qualified as Unbegotten.
4 . Proper is only suitable for one subject. But since in God there are several persons who proceed from another, nothing, it seems, prevents there from also being several who do not proceed from any other. Then it is not proper to the Father to be unbegotten.
5 . The Father is not only the principle of the “begotten” person, he is also the principle of the “proceeding” Person. If therefore, because of the opposition between the Father and the begotten Person, we make the condition of unbegotten a property of the Father, the same must be done with the condition of “improcessible”.
In the opposite sense , S. Hilaire writes: “The One proceeds from the One, that is to say that the Begotten proceeds from the Unbegotten, each having in its own right one the innascibility, the other the origin. ”
Answer:
Just as in creatures we distinguish “first principle” and “second principle”, so in the divine Persons, where there is neither before nor after, we distinguish a “Principle which has no principle” : it is the Father; and a “Principle which has a principle”: it is the Son. Now, in creatures, a first principle is recognized by a double character; the one which affects it insofar as it is a principle, consists in that it has a relation to that which proceeds from it; the other, which belongs to it as a first principle, consists in the fact that it itself does not come from a prior principle. Likewise in God: in relation to the Persons who proceed from him, the Father notifies himself to us by paternity and spiration; as “Principle which has no principle”, it is noted by this that “it is not of another”; and this is precisely the property of innascibility, that which is signified by the name “Unbegotten”.
Solutions:
1 . According to some, the innascibility signified by “unbegotten” (in the sense that this attribute is specific to the Father) would not be a simple negation. Or it would include the two aspects that we have just pointed out: that the Father does not come from any other, and that he is the Principle of the other Persons; or else it would evoke the universal “authority”, or even “the fullness of Source”. But these explanations do not seem accurate. Innascibility thus understood would not be a property distinct from paternity and spiration; it would include them, as the proper term is included in the common term. Because in God, the quality of Source or Author does not mean anything other than: Principle of origin. Let us therefore say, with S. Augustine, that “unbegotten” denies the condition of begotten: “The word: “unbegotten” does not mean anything other than: “unbegotten”. This does not prevent us from recognizing a notion specific to the Father; it is the condition of everything that is first and simple to be known negatively; thus we define the point: “That which has no parts”.
2. “Unbegotten” is sometimes taken in pure negation: S. Jerome thus says that the Holy Spirit is unbegotten, that is to say not generated. It can also be used in a private sense, without implying imperfection. Because there are several kinds of deprivation: firstly when the subject does not have what others naturally possess, but which his own nature does not require; We thus say that the stone is an inanimate thing, simply because it lacks life, while other things are naturally endowed with it. A second kind of deprivation is that of the subject who does not have what certain subjects of his own kind naturally possess; we thus say that the mole is blind. The third type is that of the subject who does not have what, by nature, he should have; and it is this deprivation which implies imperfection. Now when we qualify the Father as Unbegotten, we attribute to him a privation of the second type, and not of the third. We mean in fact that a certain suppositum of the divine nature is not generated, while another of its supposits is itself generated. But this explanation would authorize us to also qualify the Holy Spirit as unbegotten. For this name to remain specific to the Father alone, it must also be implied that it belongs to a person who is the principle of another; in other words, he denies the condition of being generated in the genus “personal principle in God”. Or again, unbegotten will mean: which does not proceed absolutely from any other, and not only: which does not proceed by way of generation. If we admit this last meaning, “unbegotten” does not suit the Holy Spirit who “is of another” by his procession, and as a subsisting person; nor does it suit the divine Essence of which it can be said that, in the Son or in the Holy Spirit, it comes from another, namely from the Father.
3 . According to S. Damascene, “unbegotten” can firstly mean uncreated; it is then a substantial predicate, which denotes the difference between created and uncreated substance. It can also mean unbegotten; it is then a relative predicate, at least to the extent that the negation is reduced to an affirmation. “Non man”, for example, is a predicate which is attached to the genus substance; “non-white” is linked to the genre quality. And since in God “begotten” evokes the relationship, “unbegotten” is also of the order of the relationship. It cannot therefore be concluded that between the unbegotten Father and the begotten Son there must be substantial diversity; there is only a relative distinction, because the relationship of Son is denied from the Father.
4. In every kind you need a first, and one only. In the divine nature, therefore, there must also be a principle which has no principle, in other words one unbegotten, and one only. From then on, to admit two Innascibles is to admit two gods, two divine natures. S. Hilaire said: “Since there is only one God, there cannot be two Innascibles. ”And the major reason for this is that, if there were two Innascibles, neither of them would come from the other; not being able to be distinguished by relative opposition, it would have to be by diversity of nature.
5. To express the property that the Father possesses of not coming from any other, he is denied the nativity of the Son rather than the procession of the Holy Spirit. This is because the procession of the Holy Spirit does not have its own and specific name, as we have seen. And it is also because it presupposes the generation of the Son, by order of nature. The mere fact of denying the Father that he is begotten, while he himself is the engendering principle, consequently implies that he does not proceed in the manner of the Holy Spirit: for the Holy Spirit, far from being principle of generation, proceeds from the begotten.
We now study the person of the Son. The Son has three names, those of “Son, Word and Image”. But the quality of Son, entirely relative to that of the Father, is elucidated by the preceding study; it remains for us to consider the Word (Q. 34) and the Image (Q. 35).