The Summa of Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas volume 1
1. Does providence suit God?
2. Are all things subject to divine providence?
3. Does divine providence extend immediately to all things?
4. Does divine providence impose necessity on things subject to it?
Article 1 — Does providence suit God?
Objections:
1. It seems not, because, according to Cicero, providence is a part of prudence. Now the prudence which, according to the Philosopher, ensures the goodness of deliberation, cannot suit God, in whom no doubts arise and who therefore has no need to deliberate.
2 . Everything in God is eternal. But providence is not an eternal thing, having as its object, says S. John Damascene, existing beings which are not eternal.
3 . There is no complexity in God; but providence seems to be something complex since it includes will and intelligence.
On the contrary , we read in the book of Wisdom (14, 3, Vg): “It is you, Father, who governs everything by your providence. "
Answer :
It is necessary to attribute providence to God. Indeed, everything that is good in things was created by God, as was previously shown. Now what is good in things is not only what relates to their substance, but also their ordination to their end, and especially to the ultimate end which is, as we have just seen, divine goodness. . This goodness which is order, which is found in created things, was therefore created by God. And since God is the cause of things by his intelligence in such a way that the formal reason for his effects must pre-exist in him, as we have shown, it is necessary that the plan according to which things are ordered to their end pre-exists in divine thought. Now precisely the rational arrangement of things which have to be ordered to an end is providence. It is in fact the main part of prudence, a part to which the other two are subordinate, insofar as, from past things remembered, and from present things grasped by the intelligence, we conjecture about future things that we have to order. Now, according to the Philosopher, it is the characteristic of prudence to order others to their end, whether it concerns oneself, as we say prudent the man who orders his actions properly. in the end which is the goal of his life, or whether it concerns other people who are subject to him, in the family, the city or the kingdom, in accordance with the word of the Gospel (Mt 24, 45) : “A faithful and prudent servant, whom the Lord has set over his family. ” It is in this last way that prudence, or providence, can suit God: for in God himself, there is nothing ordered to an end, since God is himself the ultimate end.
It is therefore the very plan according to which things are ordered to their end that we call in God “providence”. Which makes Boethius say: “Providence is the divine plan itself which, established in Him who is the sovereign master of all things, arranges everything. “We can in fact call disposition both the plan according to which things are ordered to their end and that according to which the parts are ordered among themselves, parts in the whole.
Solutions:
1.According to the Philosopher, providence, in the literal sense of the word, has the role of prescribing actions of which an auxiliary virtue, eubulia (good advice) is responsible for deliberating properly, and another, synesis ( common sense), that of judging well. Also, although deliberating does not suit God, if by this we mean an investigation into obscure questions, prescribing about things to be ordered to their end, the perfect disposition of which he carries in his mind, suits God according to this what does the Psalm say (148, 6): “He has laid down a law, which will not pass away. ” In this respect, prudence and providence therefore suit God well. But one could still respond that the very arrangement of things to be done is called deliberation in God, not because it involves research, but because of the certainty of its knowledge, a certainty which those who deliberate arrive at through research. This is how, according to St. Paul (Eph 1:11), God “works all things according to the counsel of his will”.
2 . Caring for creatures involves two things: the conception of the order to be ensured, which is called providence or provision, and the realization of this order, which is government. Of these two things, the first is eternal, the second is temporal.
3. Providence is in the intelligence, but it presupposes the will of the end, because no one prescribes the actions to be done with a view to an end if he does not want this end. Prudence therefore presupposes the moral virtues by which the appetitive powers are oriented towards the good, according to Aristotle. However, even if providence also concerned the will and the divine intelligence, this would not deviate from the simplicity of God, because the will and the intelligence, in God, are the same thing, as has already been said.
Article 2 — Are all things subject to divine providence?
Objections:
1. It seems not. Because nothing that is planned is accidental. So if everything is planned by God, nothing will be fortuitous, which makes chance and fortune disappear, contrary to common opinion.
2 . A wise providence removes, as much as possible, the defects and evil of that which it takes charge of. Now we see that there is a lot of evil in things. Either then God cannot prevent it, and then he is not omnipotent, or else he does not take care of all things.
3 . What necessarily happens does not require providence or prudence: also, according to the Philosopher, prudence is the disposition according to reason of contingent acts about which there is deliberation and election. Since many things happen necessarily, they are not all subject to providence.
4. Whoever is left to his own devices is not subject to the providence of another who governs him. Now, men are left to themselves by God according to Ecclesiasticus (15, 14): “In the beginning, God created man and left him in the hands of his own counsel. ” And this is especially true of the wicked, since it is said in the Psalm (81, 13 Vg): “He has abandoned them to the desires of their heart. ”
5 . The Apostle tells us (1 Cor 9:9): “God does not care about oxen,” and the same goes for other creatures without reason.
In the opposite sense , it is said of divine Wisdom (Sg 8,1,Vg): “It reaches with force from one end of the world to the other and arranges everything with gentleness. ”
Answer:
Some thinkers completely denied providence, like Democritus and the Epicureans, who attributed the formation of the world to chance. Others believed that only incorruptible beings are subject to providence; corruptible beings would not be corruptible with respect to individuals, but with respect to species, because, according to the species, they are incorruptible. It is in their name that Job (22.14 Vg) says about God: “The clouds are an opaque veil for him, he moves around the edges of the heavens and he does not see our affairs. ”However, Rabbi Moses excepts men from this general condition of corruptible things, because of the splendor of intelligence, of which they participate; but for other corruptible individuals he follows the preceding opinion.
But we must necessarily say that all things are subject to providence, not only in the universality of their nature, but in their singularity. And here is the proof: since every agent acts with a view to an end, the ordination of effects to the end must extend as far as the causality of the first agent extends. Indeed, it happens, in the works of an agent, that an effect occurs without being ordered to the end. This is because this effect proceeds from some other cause apart from the intention of the agent. Now the causality of God, who is the primary agent, extends to all beings, not only with regard to their specific elements, but also with regard to their individual characters, and as much to those of incorruptible things as to those of corruptible things. It is therefore necessary that all things, in one way or another, be ordained by God for an end, according to the Apostle (Rom 13:1): “The things made by God are ordained. ” Therefore, as the providence of God is nothing other than the plan of the ordination of things to their end, as has been said, it is necessary that all things, insofar as they participate in the being, are subject, to this very extent, to divine providence.
Likewise, it was shown above that God knows all things, universal and particular. And as his knowledge has the same relationship to things as that of creative art to his works, as we have said, it is necessary that all things be subject to the order designed by him just as all manufactured objects are subject to the order designed by the craftsman.
Solutions:
1. The universal cause is not the same as the particular cause. An effect can escape the order of a particular cause; but nothing related to the universal cause. Nothing, in fact, escapes the order of a particular cause except under the action of another particular antagonistic cause: thus wood is prevented from burning by the action of water. Also, as all particular causes are under the influence of the universal cause, it is impossible for an effect to escape the order of the latter. Therefore, when an effect escapes the order of some particular cause, it is said to be casual or fortuitous in relation to this particular cause; but in relation to the universal cause, from whose order it cannot escape, we say that it is foreseen, in the sense of “projected”. It is like the meeting of the two slaves which, although casual as far as they are concerned, is nevertheless prepared by the master who sends them to the same place, without the knowledge of one of the others.
2. It is different for him who is responsible for a particular good, and for him who provides for a universal whole. The first excludes as much as it can any defect in what is subject to its vigilance; while the second allows some failure to occur in one part, so as not to prevent the good of the whole. This is why the destructions and failures which are observed in the things of nature are considered contrary to a particular nature; but they are no less in the intention of universal nature, insofar as the evil of one turns to the good of the other or to the good of the whole universe. For the destruction of one is always the generation of the other, generation by which the species is preserved. Therefore, since God is the Sustainer of being in its universality, it is his providence to permit certain defects with regard to such particular things, so that the perfect good of the universe is not prevented. If he opposed all evils, many good things would be lacking in his entire work. Without the death of many animals, the life of the lion would be impossible, and the patience of martyrs would not exist without the persecution of tyrants. Also S. Augustine writes: “The Almighty God would in no way allow any evil to be introduced into his works, if he were not powerful and good enough to bring good out of evil itself. . ” It is by the two objections that we now resolve that those who have withdrawn from divine providence the care of corruptible things, where chances and evil occur, seem to have been driven.
3 . Man is not the author of nature, he only uses natural things for his usefulness in his artistic or virtuous works. This is why human providence does not extend to necessary things, which come from nature. But God's providence extends to them, because he is the author of nature. It is by this third reason that those who removed the course of natural things from the action of divine providence seem to have been led, attributing it solely to the necessity of matter, as other ancients did with Democritus. natural philosophers.
4. When we say that God left man to himself, we do not exclude him from divine providence; we only show that man is not limited in his actions by a prefixed operative virtue, determined to a single mode of action, as is the case with natural things. These are only carried out, directed towards their end by another; they do not lead themselves, do not lead themselves towards their end, as reasonable creatures do through the free will which allows them to deliberate and choose. It is the Scripture which expressly says: “He left it in the hands of his own counsel.” ” But the very act of free will is reduced to God as its cause, it is necessary that the works of free will be subject to providence. For the providence of man is under the influence of the providence of God, like a particular cause under that of the universal cause. As for righteous men, God exercises providence towards them in a more excellent manner than towards the ungodly, in that he does not allow anything to happen against them which ultimately compromises their salvation; for “for those who love God, all things work together for their good,” says the Apostle (Rom 8:28). But because he does not remove the ungodly from moral evil, he is said to abandon them.
But it is not that they are excluded in everything from his providence, for they would fall into nothingness if they were not preserved by his providence. It is this fourth reason which seems to have determined Cicero to withdraw from providence human things, about which we deliberate.
5 . Because the reasonable creature has, through free will, control over his actions, he is subject to providence in a special way, in that his actions are imputed to him on merit or fault, and he receives in return reward or punishment. It is in this respect that the Apostle withdraws the oxen from divine solicitude. But he does not mean that individual irrational creatures escape divine providence, as Rabbi Moses thought.
Article 3 - Does divine providence apply immediately to all things?
Objections:
1 . It seems that divine providence does not immediately extend to all things. For everything that dignity requires must be attributed to God. But it belongs to the dignity of a king that he has ministers in order to govern his subjects through them. Moreover, it is impossible for divine providence to take immediate care of all things.
2. The role of providence is to order things to their end. Now the end of each thing is its perfection, whereby it is good. But it is up to every cause to bring its effect to perfection. Every agent cause is therefore the cause of the effect that we attribute to providence. Therefore, if divine providence takes care of all things immediately, all secondary causes disappear.
3 . It is better, says S. Augustine, to ignore certain things than to know them, for example base things, and the Philosopher expresses the same thought in the Metaphysics. But whatever is best must be attributed to God, so God does not have immediate providence of certain vile things and evil things.
On the contrary , we read in the book of Job (34, 13 Vg): “Who else has he established on the earth, or who has he made ruler over the globe that he has formed? ” Whereupon S. Gregory writes: “He governs by himself the world which he created by himself. ”
Answer:
Providence includes two moments: the plan for the ordering of things to their end, and the implementation of this plan, which is called government. As for the first, God by his providence takes care of all things, because he has in his intelligence the representation of all things, even the smallest, and some causes which he has attributed to the various effects, it is he who gave them the virtue of producing them. Also he must first have in his intelligence the relationship of these effects to their cause. It is at the second moment that divine providence uses intermediaries, because God governs the inferiors through the superiors, not because his providence is lacking, but through a superabundance of goodness, in order to communicate to the creatures themselves the dignity of cause.
This excludes the opinion of Plato reported by St. Gregory of Nyssa, according to which there is a triple providence. The first is that of the sovereign God, who first and principally deals with spiritual things, and consequently with the whole universe with regard to genera, species and universal causes. The second providence is that which deals with individual realities in which the nature of things which are born and corrupt is realized, and Plato attributes it to the gods which roam the heavens, that is to say to the separated substances which move celestial bodies circularly. The third providence deals with human things, and Plato attributed it to the geniuses, of whom his school made intermediaries between us and the gods, as S. Augustine relates.
Solutions:
l.To have ministers to carry out the plan of his providence is the dignity of a king; but if the plan of the things he has to do is not in his mind, that is a deficiency. For all practical science is all the more perfect as it extends more completely to the particular circumstances in which the action is performed.
2 . From the fact that divine providence immediately takes care of all things, it does not in any way result in the exclusion of secondary causes, through which the divine plan is implemented, as we have just established.
3 . It is better for us to ignore vile or bad things, inasmuch as by these things we would be prevented, not being able to know everything at once, from bringing our mind to the consideration of the best, and inasmuch as thinking about evil things sometimes perverts our commitment. But this has no place in God, who sees everything with a single glance, and whose will cannot be inclined to evil.
Article 4 - Does divine providence impose necessity on things subject to it?
Objections:
1 . It seems so. For every effect whose proper cause already is or has been, if, this cause being posited, it cannot fail to follow, is necessarily produced, as Aristotle proves. But the providence of God, since it is eternal, pre-exists, and it is necessary that the effect projected by it comes to pass, because divine providence cannot be in default. Therefore divine providence imposes necessity on what it governs.
2 . The person who projects a work insures it as best he can against any failure. But God is all-powerful. So he gives to the things prepared by his providence the stability that necessity provides.
3 . Boethius says, speaking of destiny: “From the primary and immutable data of providence, it binds the actions and fate of men to the infrangible connection of causes. ” It therefore seems that providence imposes necessity on the things which are subject to it.
On the contrary , Dionysius writes: “Corrupting nature is not the work of divine providence. ” Now, by nature certain things are contingent. Therefore divine providence does not impose on things a necessity which would exclude contingency.
Answer :
Divine providence imposes necessity on certain things; but not to all, as some philosophers have believed. It is indeed up to providence to order things to their end. Now, after divine goodness which is the transcendent end, the first of the goods immanent in things themselves is the perfection of the universe, a perfection which would not exist if all the degrees of being were not found in things. It therefore belongs to divine providence to produce all the degrees of beings. And this is why for certain effects it has prepared necessary causes so that they necessarily occur, and for certain others contingent causes so that they happen contingently, according to the condition of the proximate causes.
Solutions:
1 . The effect of divine providence is not only that a thing happens in any way, but that it happens, as the case may be, either necessarily or contingently. And this is why an event happens infallibly and necessarily when divine providence has ordained that it should happen thus; and it happens contingently when the plan of divine providence has determined that it would happen thus.
2 . The order of divine providence is immutable and certain precisely in that all things subject to it happen in the manner in which it was arranged: necessarily, or contingently.
3 . Boethius' words on the immutable and indissoluble destiny relate to the infallibility of providence, the effects of which cannot be lacking, any more than the manner, foreseen by it, in which these effects are produced. This is not about the necessity of the effects themselves. Because we must consider that the necessary and the contingent are attributes of the being as such. Also the mode of contingency or necessity falls under the providence of God, who is the manager of being in its totality, and not under that of particular agents.
After divine providence, we must study predestination and the book of life (Q. 24).