Sep 30, 2026
Archbishop Carlo Maria Viganò recently made a number of criticisms of
'sedevacantism' – but do they stand up to scrutiny?
Following the release of his recent essay The Capital Schism, Archbishop Carlo Maria Viganò gave an exclusive three-part interview to LifeSiteNews.
EXCLUSIVE: Archbishop Viganò says restraint on Antichrist loosened at Vatican II
EXCLUSIVE: Abp. Viganò says Leo XIV has intensified Francis’s agenda, not slowed it
EXCLUSIVE: Abp. Viganò: The Catholic Church ‘is alive’; the ‘synodal church is a corpse’
The interview covered a range of topics about the state of the Church. In the third part, he made a number of critical comments about “sedevacantism” and explained why he is not a “sedevacantist.”
However, a number of these criticisms were “wide of the mark.” Whether one holds to the “sedevacantist” conclusion or not, it is necessary that such criticisms address what “sedevacantists” actually believe and argue.
This is a response to his criticisms and certain misconceptions behind them, and will be made in the same dispassionate and respectful way that Viganò himself addressed the question.
What is ‘sedevacantism?’
“Sedevacantism” is a controversial term for a controversial idea. The term itself is generally ill-defined and misunderstood. In its essence, it refers to the conclusion that the Holy See is currently vacant, at least in the sense that the apparent occupants do not possess the authority of Christ to teach, rule and sanctify the Church. This is typically dated to some time around or before the Second Vatican Council (1962-65).
All other issues that are commonly associated with “sedevacantism” – when the vacancy started, how it could end, its implications for other issues in the interim – are secondary and stand and fall on their own arguments.
As it is a conclusion, it is not a movement or a group. Those who hold to this conclusion may be found in chapels that have organized themselves around it, but they may also be found attending the chapels of the SSPX, approved Traditional Latin Mass groups, or even the Novus Ordo Masses at diocesan chapels. It is not proper to speak of “the sedevacantists” as if they represent a distinct organized group; nor is there a “sedevacantist platform” or a list of “sedevacantist tenets” – although there is less diversity of belief among “sedevacantists” than exists among “sedeplenists” (those who believe the Holy See to be legitimately occupied).
The terms “sedevacantism” or “sedevacantists” are not universally accepted by those who hold that the See is vacant, and have often proved unhelpful. For instance, the traditionalist pioneer Père Noël Barbara wrote:
Some have cleverly invented the term ‘sedevacantist’ and apply it to us in a derogatory sense; but we are no more ‘sedevacantists’ than we are ‘traditionalists.’ We are Catholics, and it is precisely for that reason that we must insist so strongly on the urgent need to submit to the magisterium of the popes and of the councils. [1]
Nonetheless, I shall use them for the sake of ease, and without further “scare quotes” around them.
Let us proceed to Viganò’s comments.
Sedevacantism and papolatry are mirror-image errors?
The Archbishop writes:
I answer that sedevacantism and papolatry are two mirror-image errors, born from the same premise: that the person and the office coincide. The papolatrist says: since this man is pope, everything he does is good. The sedevacantist says: since what he does is not good, this man is not pope.
On the contrary, sedevacantists do indeed distinguish between the office and the officeholder, and the seat and “seated.” This is why the essence of their position is that the office or seat is vacant. [2]
More important, sedevacantists do not say “Since what he does is not good, this man is not pope.” This is a caricature that has been rejected very many times over the last several decades.
First, such an idea is contradicted by sedevacantists themselves. For example, Mgr Guérard des Lauriers, OP – a French Dominican theologian of the Pontifical Lateran University in Rome, one of the earlier pioneers of the “traditionalist” response to Vatican II, and the framer of an important explanation of the current vacancy (the “Cassiciacum Thesis”) – said:
A morally bad Pope remains Pope. Conversely, it suffices for “authority” to be objectively schismatic for it no longer to be Authority. It is therefore unnecessary, for our purposes, to examine whether “authority” has been or is subjectively schismatic. [3]
We could consider also the following sedevacantist sources, as evidence that this caricature is rejected:
Resistance to the Pope: A Text of St Robert Bellarmine – Père Guérard des Lauriers & Abbé Bernard Lucien. In Cahiers de Cassiciacum, vol. 3-4, a text attributable to one or both of the writers notes:
Indeed, we do not claim, as some falsely accuse us, that under no circumstances whatsoever is it possible to resist a true Pope. Rather, we assert that the current resistance is not resistance to a true Pope, and cannot be.
De Ecclesia, Lecture 3, 2025-6 – Bishop Donald Sanborn:
This is a doctrinal dispute. It is not that the pope is running around with women or something like that. This is a doctrinal dispute. (…) If a Pope told you to go rob a bank, you could resist it. That’s a personal command and a specific thing. You see, you could say, ‘No, Holy Father, I’m not going to go rob the bank. You’re telling me to do something wrong.’
But when it involves the indefectibility and infallibility of the Church by proposing false doctrine, false liturgical practices, false disciplines, etc., which are discontinuous or which are in contradiction to previous doctrine etc., then you’re involving the assistance of the Holy Ghost to the Church, and that argument doesn’t count. Therefore, in other words, it’s a whole different thing. It’s not a particular command to a particular person. It’s a universal command to the universal church. That’s the problem.
The Errors of the ‘Recognize and Resist’ System – Abbé Damien Dutertre, RCI:
The particular commands, and the personal actions of the pope, are not the object of the special assistance promised by Christ to His Church through the divine institution of the papacy. They may sometimes be legitimately resisted and denounced.
The “Bad Popes” Argument – Novus Ordo Watch:
A man who professes the Catholic Faith whole and entire, no matter how wicked he may be, remains a member of the Catholic Church. Even if he hate God. Even if he be a murderer. Even if he be a sodomite.
Sedevacantism and Theology of the Church – John Lane:
How exactly did Paul VI make himself unable to be obeyed? Watch the drama unfold with Lefebvre. Montini is unhappy with Lefebvre failing to accept the New Mass; he won’t allow Écône to continue unless it accepts the New Mass. But a Catholic who is informed and faithful cannot accept the New Mass. And note well, this is not just a matter of some specific command or other that might be regarded as an exception, that might be set aside pending further clarification or whatever, while the superior-subject relation continues in all other respects.
True & false obedience: Have sedevacantists misunderstood this basic distinction?:
(S)edevacantists recognize that the distinction between true and false obedience applies even to commands of the pope, and that they could theoretically be evil.
Thus it is clear: sedevacantists do not say, “Since what he does is not good, this man is not pope.” It is acknowledged that the Pope may do evil, and need to be resisted, whilst still remaining Pope. The actual argument is more specific about what a Pope can and cannot do.
Let us next point out that the arguments for the sedevacantist conclusion are far from this simplistic caricature. These are among the key arguments:
Argument from infallibility/indefectibility
From Vatican II
From the promulgation of error under circumstances otherwise indicating infallibility
From universal disciplinary laws
From the canonization of saints
Argument from membership of the Church
Argument from defective intention
Argument from the habitual assistance of God
Argument from the marks of the Church
Argument from abductive reasoning
These are briefly explained in an appendix following this piece. The point is not to present these arguments as proper demonstrations, but rather to demonstrate that they are proper arguments, and that they have nothing to do with the caricature presented by Archbishop Viganò.
In addition, we could add that some who believe that the problem began with Francis employ a further argument:
Argument from procedural impropriety.
Viganò on the exercise of the office
The Archbishop next states:
I say instead the only thing that the facts permit: that the office belongs to Christ, that the one who occupies it today truly occupies it, but that he exercises it against the end for which it exists.
This argument is related to the “argument from defective intention” mentioned above, and to Msgr. Guérard des Lauriers’ concept of “capital schism” – recently adopted in a simplified form by Archbishop Viganò himself in his essay The Capital Schism.
Mgsr. Guérard’s argument acknowledges that “the one who occupies (the See) today truly occupies it,” but in a merely “material” way (materialiter). In other words, the man is not the Pope formally (formaliter); he is not the Pope. Msgr. Guérard states:
The state of capital schism excludes (…) being Pope formaliter; but this state does not exclude his being Pope materialiter. [4]
It appears that Archbishop Viganò is borrowing the language from one part of Msgr. Guérard’s “Cassiciacum Thesis,” combining it with argument from the defect of intention, and arriving at a conclusion that is contrary to both.
However, this is simply mentioned in passing. Let us continue with our response.
The Pope heretic question
Archbishop Viganò then refers to St. Robert Bellarmine and the “Pope Heretic” question:
That a pontiff may fail in his mandate is not my thesis: the question of the papa hæreticus was debated for centuries by the most authoritative theologians, and the Church never resolved it with a definition.
Saint Robert Bellarmine enumerated the opinions without closing the question, and gave the faithful the practical rule that is sufficient for me: sicut licet resistere Pontifici invadenti corpus, ita licet resistere invadenti animas – “just as it is lawful to resist the Pontiff who assaults the body, so it is lawful to resist him when he assaults souls.” To resist: not to depose.
This is inaccurate on a number of counts.
First, as the list of arguments provided above shows, the argument from the personal heresy of the Pope is not only not the sole argument, but it is actually “downstream” of more fundamental arguments – principally those based on the indefectibility and infallibility of the Church. As such, even if a manifestly heretical Pope retains office, and does not lose it automatically, the conclusion of the vacancy would remain standing on the other arguments.
Next, while it is true that the issue was debated for several centuries, and that Church has not settled the issue with a definition, the so-called “fifth position” (a manifest heretic loses office ipso facto) appears to be the more common position. Many weighty authorities [5] hold to this position and defend it with arguments that appear more convincing and certain than those of their opponents. One is most certainly permitted to hold to it, and to the principles upon which it is based.
Third, St. Robert Bellarmine did indeed “close the question,” at least as far as forming a clear conclusion of his own. He held that the “first opinion” – that a Pope could not fall into heresy at all – was “probable and can easily be defended”; however, he added that “it is not certain,” and proceeded to consider the others. After explaining and rejecting three further positions, he arrives at the fifth and described it as “the true opinion.” He stated that it was based on a principle that was “most certain,” held by “all the ancient fathers,” who taught it “unanimously.”
This may, on first glance, appear to contradict the idea that the “first position” (the Pope cannot be a heretic) is “probable.” But this is not the case. Bellarmine is saying that if Pope could fall into manifest heresy, then the “fifth position” must be true, and that he automatically ceases to be Pope. [6]
This is precisely “closing the question” – as far as his own position is concerned – of would what happen in the event of a manifestly heretical Pope, if such a scenario could occur; the fact that he did not think such an event probable is irrelevant. This does not, of course, mean that he “closed the question” such that Catholics are obliged to adopt his position; but it inaccurate to say that Bellarmine “enumerated the opinions without closing the question.”
Archbishop Viganò and Bellarmine’s ‘resistance quotes’
Viganò’s comment may also inadvertently convey that Bellarmine’s “resistance quote” was given in the context of his treatment of the “Pope Heretic” question. But this is certainly not the case.
Two such passages from St. Robert are typically cited.
One appears in Ch. 19 of De Conciliis, and forms part of Bellarmine’s long discussion of the superiority of the Pope over a Council; the immediate context is how the Church should respond to “a wicked Pope” who tries to “oppress and destroy all with impunity.” Here, the objection states:
But they say, therefore the Church remains without remedy if it has a wicked pope, and the pope could oppress and destroy all with impunity, and no one could resist him.
Here is Bellarmine’s answer:
I reply, it is no wonder if the Church remains without an effective human remedy, since its salvation does not principally rely on human effort but on divine protection, for its king is God. Therefore, even if the Church cannot depose a pope, it can and must supplicate the Lord to provide a remedy. And it is certain that God will care for its salvation, who will either convert such a pope or remove him from the midst before he destroys the Church.
Nor does it follow that it is not lawful to resist a pope destroying the Church; for it is lawful to admonish him with due reverence, and to correct him modestly, and even to oppose him with force and arms if he seeks to destroy the Church. For to resist and repel force with force requires no authority. See John of Torquemada on this matter, Book II, Chapter 106.
The other passage appears in Book II, Ch. 29 of De Romano Pontifice. This is the chapter preceding the “Pope Heretic” discussion, and it deals with a different topic altogether – a Pope who “upsets the republic,” or who “tends to kill souls by his bad example.” The objection states:
The seventh argument. It is allowed for each person to kill the pontiff, if he is unjustly attacked by him. Therefore, much more will it be allowed for kings or a council to depose a pontiff, if he upsets the republic, or he tends to kill souls by his bad example.[7]
Here is Bellarmine’s answer:
I respond by denying the consequence, because in order to resist an attacker and to defend oneself no authority is needed. And it is not necessary that the one who is attacked is the judge or superior of the one attacking him; but authority is required in order to judge and punish.
Therefore, just as it is permitted to resist a pontiff attacking the body, so it is permitted to resist anyone attacking souls, or upsetting the republic, or much more if he is trying to destroy the Church.
It is permitted, I say, to resist him by not doing what he commands, or by hindering the accomplishment of his will. However, it is not permitted to judge, or punish, or depose him, which can be done only by his superior. On this matter see Cajetan in the treatise on the authority of pope and council in chapter 27. And John de Turrecremata in book 2, chapter 106.
It is tempting to read these texts and assume that they are relevant to our situation. After all, what could be more destructive to the Church and to souls than heretical teaching and evil laws? However, such an assumption is unsound.
First, Bellarmine does not explain here exactly what he means by “attacking souls” or “destroying the Church,” the context of the objections provides the necessary context – and it does not work in favour of them being relevant to our situation.
Readers will also have seen that Bellarmine refers to two earlier texts from the great Dominican theologians Cardinals Cajetan and Torquemada. He is following these two doctors and adopting their language; and as they were much more explicit about what they had in mind, we can assume that he followed them there too. Let us consider the fuller treatments they provide.
What Cardinal Torquemada says
In the context of explaining the superiority of the Pope over a Council, Cardinal Torquemada gives the following example:
(T)hey ask what ought to be done against a pope, should it happen that he is incorrigibly corrupted in his morals, even to the scandal of the faithful, or that he abuses his power, is a squanderer of the Church, (or) wishes to grant ecclesiastical benefices solely by simony. [8]
He gives another set of examples, stating that he is himself following the earlier Dominican doctor Peter Paludanus:
(I)f (as master Peter Paludanus illustrates) the pope wished to give the Church’s treasure to his relatives, or to demolish the church of Saint Peter in order to build palaces for his family, or to bestow Saint Peter’s patrimony (an act which is forbidden), or do anything else of that sort – although such a thing is unlikely, he must not be allowed to carry it out, but ought to be resisted and not obeyed, yet without being deposed.
Likewise, if he wished to attempt anything generally against the status of the universal Church – such as deposing all bishops or other measures by which the universal Church would be disturbed – then, as Hostien, Innocentius, and Archydia say, the pope should not be tolerated (i.e., permitted to do this), but one ought nevertheless to resist him with humility and reverence. [9]
There is nothing here to indicate that Torquemada considered it possible for the Pope to teach heresy or condemned errors, promulgate a new religion, or to enact evil laws, whilst remaining Pope. On the contrary, Torquemada famously held to the “second opinion” on the “Pope Heretic” question – that even a secretly heretical Pope loses office automatically; he thought that pertinacity in heresy could be established even by someone defending new errors in the defense of heresy.[10] He also held that a Pope would be a schismatic if he fell “into disobedience and pertinacious non-observance of those things which are ordained for the common state of the Church” – which is commonly understood to apply to the traditional rites of the Church [11] – and that under such circumstances, the Holy See “is understood to be vacant.” [12]
What Cardinal Cajetan says
The text from Cajetan on resistance is essentially identical. It explicitly excludes matters of doctrine and heresy from the discussion and deals only with matters such as simony, selling the Church’s goods, immorality, and so on. Further, Cajetan famously argued that, when it came to matters of heresy, the Pope should be deposed (the “fourth opinion”); in a later work, he appears to have adopted the “second opinion” of Torquemada.
Renowned 16th-century theologian Francisco Suárez, and later theologians such as Fr. Domenico Palmieri, SJ, all interpret these texts the same way. For example, Palmieri states:
(T)hose men miserably deceive themselves who think that they can adhere to the Roman See and the Roman Church while resisting the Pontiff.[13]
There is no contradiction between the position of Palmieri and that of Bellarmine, because the “resistance quotes” of the authorities cited pertain to categories of acts that have nothing to do with the Pope’s exercise of his magisterium.
The other aspects of what Bellarmine says
The second reason why the “resistance quotes” do not provide a solution for our situation is found in the fact that Bellarmine himself excludes the possibility of a Pope leading the Church into error by his teaching. Bellarmine states:
Hence the argument goes like this: the Pontiff is the shepherd and teacher of the whole Church; therefore, the whole Church is bound to hear him and to follow him; therefore, if he errs, the whole Church will err. They will respond that the Church must hear him, if he teaches rightly, otherwise God should be listened to more than men.
But I object to that; for, who will judge whether the Pontiff is teaching correctly or not? For it is not the part of the sheep to judge whether the shepherd errs or not, especially in matters truly doubtful. And Christian sheep do not have another major judge or teacher to whom they can appeal. For, as we showed above in book 2, chapters 13 and 14, from the whole Church one can appeal to the Pontiff, but there is no appeal from him. Necessarily, therefore, the whole Church will err, if the Pontiff errs. [14]
Further, as we have seen, Bellarmine also states that if a Pope were to manifest his heresy publicly, then he would lose office by that very fact. Elsewhere, to illustrate by contrast why heretics who have not externalized their heresies remain Catholics, [15] Bellarmine refers to the canon Audivimus and explains that it means that a prelate, “from the moment he begins to preach heresies,” loses jurisdiction and office. [16]
In another place again, Bellarmine states that “the people should not judge their pastor unless they hear something new and contrary to the doctrine of other pastors” – at which point he adds:
(T)his is what Paul advises in Galatians 1: that we should anathematize those who teach new doctrines that are contrary to what has been preached before.
Thus, the “resistance quote” from Bellarmine, which Archbishop Viganò raises against sedevacantists, is not at all to the point.
However, Bellarmine – and the other doctors cited – also add that the faithful are not to “depose” heretical pastors, and this leads us to the next comment which we must address.
‘To resist: not to depose’
Archbishop Viganò writes:
To resist: not to depose.
Because this is precisely the point. To depose a pope, or to declare the See vacant, is an act of jurisdiction, and no private individual – whether bishop or layman – possesses the jurisdiction to perform it.
On the contrary, this is precisely not the point.
Sedevacantists agree that they have no power to “depose” a Pope, or to “declare the See vacant” as private individuals.
First, sedevacantists typically claim either that these men have deposed themselves by positing public acts incompatible with retaining office (which is the essence of Bellarmine’s “fifth opinion”), or that they never attained the papacy at all. There is absolutely no sense in which any sedevacantist is engaged in deposing a Pope; therefore, there is no pretense to possess jurisdiction to do so.
As for “declaring” the See to be vacant: the word “declare” can be used in different sense. On the one hand, it may be understood in the strict sense in which Viganò presents it: as an act of jurisdiction, creating obligations on one’s subjects. It is possible that a diocesan ordinary might have such a power; but it is certainly not the case for any layman, priest, auxiliary bishop, or traditionalist clergyman.
On the other hand, the word may be understood in a broader sense, merely as a clear announcement of one’s views on a given topic, controversial or otherwise. It is solely in this latter sense that sedevacantists might “declare” that the See is vacant.
We may also note that the Archbishop’s interview and various statements are full of “declarations” in this second sense, and we have already seen several such examples:
That “sedevacantism and papolatry are two mirror-image errors, born from the same premise”
That Leo XIV “exercises (the office of the papacy) against the end for which it exists”
Elsewhere in the interview, Viganò “declares” that:
“Bergoglio dismantled the Papacy violently; Prevost gives that dismantling an institutional, ‘orderly,’ almost reassuring form.”
But such “declarations” need not be limited solely to the Papacy. The same can be said of Viganò’s comments about the liturgical reform:
“(The Vatican authorities) persecute (the traditional Mass) because they know perfectly well that they do not express the same faith, and that as long as a single altar safeguards the ancient lex orandi, the new one cannot claim victory.”
These comments are all “declarations” in the second, broad sense – and, if a Catholic considers himself justified in making such “declarations” about a sitting Pontiff, or about apparently “papally-approved” liturgical rites, then he cannot reasonably object to other Catholics “declaring,” based on serious theological arguments, that they have concluded the man is not a sitting Pontiff. In fact, I would argue that one is more justified in making the latter claim than the former.
‘Private judgments’
What we have just discussed may also be applied to the Archbishop’s claim that a “declaration” of the vacancy is a “private judgment,” as he proceeds to say:
Whoever arrogates such power to himself commits, in reversed form, the same abuse that he reproaches Rome for: he makes himself the measure of that of which he is only the guardian. And he suffers the consequence: a Church without a visible See, without the possibility of a future pope through the ordinary means, without any other criterion than the private judgment of those who have declared it vacant.
This passage raises both the question of “private judgment” and of the attaining of a future Pope. Before addressing the former, let us recall that:
We have already seen that no sedevacantist “arrogates” jurisdiction to himself.
The “abuse” for which sedevacantists reproach the Vatican is not that the Pope “makes himself the measure of that of which he is only the guardian”, but rather that these men propose and impose a “new form” of religion, teach error and heresy, and promulgate evil laws.
Viganò earlier suggested that sedevacantists were unable to distinguish between the See and the “seated”; it is ironic that he himself now conflates them by asserting that having no person “seated” means being deprived of a visible See. The truth is precisely the opposite.
By referring to the sedevacantist conclusion as a “private judgment,” Archbishop Viganò may be overlooking the nature of the judgment in question as a cognitive judgment, rather than an authoritative one.
In broad, colloquial terms, a cognitive judgment is simply drawing a conclusion. One concludes that something is true or false; good or bad; verified or unverified; long or short; and so on. [17] Such judgments are an essential operation of the mind, and without them, reasoning is impossible.
An authoritative declaration makes known and imposes an authoritative judgment, whereas a declaration in the broad sense merely makes known a cognitive judgment, without any pretense to impose it on others. Just as Viganò himself has made many declarations in the broad sense, so too has he made the many cognitive judgments which his declarations make known. These cognitive judgments are indeed judgments made by him as a private person, as are the following:
That it is legitimate for Archbishop Viganò to continue operating as a bishop and running a seminary after being declared excommunicate by the Vatican
That the SSPX episcopal consecrations in 1988 and 2026 were legitimate
That the penalties and rulings following the SSPX consecrations are to be disregarded.
These are all significant examples, because they are judgments made against an apparent public judgment of authority. This is not to say that the Archbishop is mistaken in his judgments – it is simply to recognize them for what they are.
Further, one also makes a private and cognitive judgment that the Catholic faith is true, and that a given public judgment is indeed legitimate and such that we must accept it. There is, in essence, no way to avoid making private judgments – except to stop thinking altogether.
This also applies to the Pope question. The identity of the Pope is not a fact that is infused directly into our brain: There are objective criteria by which we recognize a man is the Pope. At the minimum, these include a valid election and acceptance, and the person being eligible for the office (viz., he is a baptized male Catholic with the use of reason).
But, as Aristotle said:
Where it is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act, and vice versa. [18]
Applied to this topic, if it is in our power to judge that a man is the Pope because the criteria are fulfilled, it is also in our power to recognize that a man is not the Pope if the criteria are not fulfilled. In fact, we make such a judgment habitually, in that we all recognize that neither Archbishop Viganò nor President Donald Trump are the Pope.
We are thus faced with a legitimate question, and an understandable but ultimately unfounded scruple. The question is: What are the true criteria; the scruple is that One cannot arrive at a conclusion rejected by the cardinals and the vast majority of the world.
Regarding the scruple, basically every controversial position adopted by traditional Catholics (and, increasingly, even “conservative Catholics”) is rejected by the cardinals and the vast majority of the world. There is no clear reason for judging (!) those judgments to be legitimate, but then judging (!) the cognitive judgment that the See is vacant to be illegitimate. Thus, to say that one does not have the authority to make a “private judgment” about the Pope question is simply to misunderstand the terms.
Many Catholics see “private judgment” as the hallmark of the Protestant, and try to act in a way that avoids making such judgments. We have seen that this is based on a misconception of the notion of a judgment; it is also based on a misconception of the “private judgment” of the Protestants. Their “private judgment” refers to the idea that Christians can and should interpret the sources of revelation according to their own lights and accept only those truths which he himself has decided are true or revealed – without regard for any kind of ecclesiastical authority. This has nothing to do with the case at hand, as the earlier texts from Bellarmine demonstrated. [19]
The election of a new Pope
Archbishop Viganò’s comment about the “possibility of a future Pope” contains two points.
That a future Pope “through the ordinary means” cannot be attained
That the only criterion for recognizing the legitimacy of a future Pope will be “the private judgment of those who have declared it vacant.”
As for the first question, we must ask what is meant by “the ordinary means” before we can consider whether a future Pope may only be obtained through them. If the Council of Constance, which elected Pope Martin V, is considered to be an example of the “ordinary means,” then clearly they are considerably wider than may be assumed.
Further, some sedevacantists – both adherents of the Thesis of Cassiciacum, and others – have explained at length how an actual Catholic elected at Conclave, who resolves the crisis in the Church (e.g., by actions such as abrogating Vatican II, etc.) and may become the true Pope.
For many of the former, the conclave was already legitimate, and such actions may represent the forming of a proper objective intention, leading to the man who was Pope only materialiter becoming Pope formaliter. For others – as I explained prior to the May 2025 conclave – such a man posits no obstacle to becoming Pope (e.g., he is not a heretic), and although the election itself may not be valid, he may attain to the papacy through the universal and peaceful adherence of the Church. [20]
Perhaps it may be thought that these explanations suffer from Archbishop Viganò’s second criticism: That determining who had truly ascended to the papal office would be a “private judgment” of sedevacantists. Leaving aside what we have already discussed about the irrelevance of the term “private judgment” in this context, this criticism may be dispelled by asking a question of Archbishop Viganò and those who reject the sedevacantist conclusion.
Assuming agreement that the Church is indeed in a crisis, by what criterion will you privately judge (!) that the crisis has ended, and that normal relations may be resumed with the man you hold to be Pope?
I believe that to ask this question is to answer it.
‘A dead end’
Archbishop Viganò observes of the sedevacantist conclusion:
It is a path that ends in a dead end, and I have seen it close in on too many sincere souls.
Here, the Archbishop adopts the “traffic-based” trope very commonly used in criticisms of sedevacantism:
Of these “traffic-based” tropes, the “dead end” accusation in particular is very common – but it is necessary to consider it a little further.
If one’s home is located at the end of a cul-de-sac, a “dead end” is precisely where one would want to be and remain. This would certainly be better than being stuck on a roundabout or traffic circle forever. Further, we could consider the following examples of “dead ends”:
Heaven (There is nowhere else to go)
The Church (No more religions to try)
Marriage (No more women to court).
Thus, not all “dead ends” are bad.
But in what sense, anyway, is sedevacantism supposed to be a dead end? We have already seen that it is not because there is no possibility of a future Pope. Nor is it because there is nothing to “do”: The means of attaining a future Pope include very obvious things to “do” (namely, pray, proclaim the truth, seek the return of our fellow men to the Faith and, for those whose office it is, to take the actions necessary to secure the election of a true pope). Living a Catholic life, so that we can save our souls, remains not only a possibility but an obligation.
Archbishop Viganò writes that he has “seen (this dead end) close in on too many sincere souls.” What precisely does this mean? He does not say. During this crisis, many who recognize the recent papal claimants follow them into error, into mortal sin (such as that permitted in Amoris Laetitia), or even apostatize outright. Traditionalist sedeplenists often appear to live in a state of constant tension and conflict with those they simultaneously regard as their lawful pastors and as enemies of the faith.
On the other hand, many sedevacantists find peace, joy, and security in embracing a position that is reconcilable with every dogma of the faith and is contrary to none.
The idea of a vacant See might seem frightening to those who have not yet acknowledged it, but arriving at this conclusion grants us the joy of recognizing that the Church, although suffering, is indeed the glorious Mother described by her Popes and theologians.
This conclusion gives us the peace of knowing that we are the sons of this divinely instituted, divinely guided and guarded Church – and that while we are not thereby excused from fighting for her honor and that of her divine Spouse, she is not a natural institution that may fall, and she does not need to be saved by our activism.
It gives us the security of having a clear line drawn between the teaching, laws, writings, rites, and devotions that come to us with her guarantees, and those that do not.
As the Archbishop refers to his anecdotal experience with “many sincere souls,” I will speak personally as well: The peace and joy that I was granted by arriving at this conclusion many years ago have still not faded. I believe them to be supernatural, and I thank God and his Holy Mother for them.
A humble and decisive reason for not being a sedevacantist?
The Archbishop concludes his answer to the question on sedevacantism with the following:
There is then a more humble reason, and for me a decisive one. I do not know what the ultimate solution to this mystery is, and I do not presume to know it: a pope or a council will resolve it, or Our Lord Himself when He wills. But I know what my duty is in the meantime, and it requires no juridical sentence. It is not my place to depose a pope: nor is it my place to follow him into error, and as a pastor I have the duty to warn the Lord’s flock.
In this final passage, Archbishop Viganò introduces the idea of a “juridical sentence” – the implication being that the Holy See cannot currently be vacant unless there has been a sentence to that effect; and that, presumably, it is not vacant.
But this is not the case. As we have already mentioned, sedevacantists agree that it is not their place to “depose” a Pope. There is no authority that can depose a Pope, and this is one of the reasons …
Why Bellarmine said that the “fifth opinion” was the true one – because every other position involved some authority judging the Pope (as explained by sedeplenist Arnaldo da Silveira)
Why those doctors who disagreed with the “fifth opinion” tried to devise ways of explaining why the “fourth opinion” did not really involve deposing a Pope
Why sedevacantists have adopted this conclusion.
By “the ultimate solution,” however, Viganò seems to mean either (a) how the crisis will end, or (b) the complete explanation for what is going on.
In regard to the former, one does not need to know how this crisis will end in order to recognize the cause; this would be like denying one has cancer, because one does not know how to cure it. Further, who would have known how the Great Western Schism would have been brought to an end?
In regard to the latter, we may note that the entire traditional Catholic position is ultimately rooted in two phrases from St. Paul.
“If any one preach to you a gospel, besides that which you have received, let him be anathema.” (Gal. 1.9)
“Stand fast: and hold the traditions, which you have learned.” (2 Thess. 2.14)
All more developed positions – whether the See is vacant, or that a true Pope can propose a new religion, false teaching, evil laws, and defective liturgical rites, and that Catholics should recognize his legitimacy while resisting all these aberrations – depend on these two principles as their starting point. For this reason, it may seem difficult to find fault in someone adhering to a practical program of rejecting novelties, holding fast to tradition, leaving difficult questions for the future, and taking the safer course on disputed topics.
But in reality, very few persons have been able to maintain such a practical position without adopting some sort of theory to explain it – often at the expense of Catholic doctrine. Therefore, given that any man who thinks about these issues – and certainly any man who writes about them, speaks to them or others, or has to make decisions relating to hem (such as both the clergy and fathers of families) – is likely to form an explanation, however provisional, we have an obligation to ensure that the explanation adopted is theologically sound. (In this context we may note that St. Paul did not say of the preacher of a new Gospel, “let him be recognized and resisted”, but rather “let him be anathema.”)
Finally, the possible legitimacy of a purely practical position does not exclude the legitimacy of seeking a deeper understanding of the crisis. One is not obliged to stay on the practical plane forever; [21] nor would this be desirable, if we can do otherwise. Our intellects were made for truth, and we long to know and possess the truth; we should not be afraid to seek after it, and to embrace it when we find it. If anything is a dead end, it is staying on the merely practical plane when it is not necessary.
Conclusion
I submit to Archbishop Viganò that the truth about the current crisis is indeed knowable with certainty in our day, and that it is indeed not necessary to remain on the practical level expressed.
That truth, I submit, is that the men who have been materially occupying the Holy See these last years have lacked the authority of Christ to teach, rule and sanctify the Church. They are not “with” Our Lord Jesus Christ, and as a necessary result, he is not “with” them, in the sense necessary for them to hold such authority. They are, therefore, not true Popes.
However, this is not the place to demonstrate such a conclusion itself with any rigor. My purpose was to answer certain misconceptions and objections raised in the Archbishop’s answer to one of the questions in the interview, and I have now completed this task. May the good Lord enlighten us all, that we “may be sanctified in truth” (John 17:19).
Appendix
Toward the start of the article, I listed a number of the arguments employed in defense of the sedevacantist conclusion. Here are some brief summaries of these arguments, along with links to more developed explanations.
Each of these arguments’ premises can be challenged, and would need to be explained and defended. But as stated above:
The point is not to present these arguments as proper demonstrations, but rather to demonstrate that they are proper arguments, and that they have nothing to do with the caricature presented by Archbishop Viganò.
Opponents of the sedevacantist conclusion will also find the references a helpful aid in ensuring that they are replying to the arguments made, rather than strawmen.
Arguments from infallibility/indefectibility
This is the most fundamental argument. It states that it is impossible for a pope – whether alone, or in Council – to teach error under conditions that indicate infallibility – and points to examples in Vatican II (particularly Dignitatis Humanae) of errors taught under such conditions. A similar argument may be made with reference to the universal ordinary magisterium, for opponents who claim that Dignitatis Humanae did not teach under such conditions.
It also considers, a fortiori, that it is impossible for the Pope to introduce a new religion – and takes seriously comments made by men such as Archbishop Lefebvre [22] and even Bishop Joseph Strickland [23]
What Leo XIV’s ‘complete commitment’ to Vatican II REALLY means
On the Indefectibility of the Church (Abbé Damien Dutertre)
Sedevacantism and Theology of the Church (John Lane)
‘Spotless and Unsullied’ – Indefectibility and the Extended Vacancy
This argument may also be subdivided further, recalling that the Church teaches that the Pope cannot promulgate universal disciplinary laws that contain anything that is dangerous, harmful, or contrary to the faith – and points to examples of such laws promulgated in recent years.
The Infallibility of General Disciplinary Laws (Abbé Hervé Belmont)
The same principles (relating to the “secondary object of infallibility”) apply to canonizations of manifestly unworthy men.
Dogmatic Suicide – canonizations, infallibility and the consequences
Argument from membership of the Church
This argument bases the vacancy on public heresy, schism, and apostasy, that exclude a person from membership of the Church – and therefore render them incapable of holding office in the Church.
Is Francis the pope? The argument from public heresy suggests not (Matthew McCusker)
Key aspects of this argument are expanded upon and deepened here:
Reply to Matt Gaspers: Public heresy gives certainty that Francis isn’t pope (Matthew McCusker)
Argument from defective intention
This argument, proposed by Msgr. Guérard des Lauriers and followed by adherents of his Cassiciacum Thesis and others – and promoted in some form by Archbishop Viganò himself – states that a man does not become Pope formaliter if he does not have the proper intention to accept the election and to procure the good of the Church. This lack of an objective and habitual intention can be discerned with certainty from the person’s actions (as well as from subsequent acts which may be impossible for a true Pope to commit).
Source: (see next question)
Argument from the habitual assistance of God
The assistance of God enjoyed by the Pope does not absolutely exclude the possibility of some error in the exercise of the non-infallible, “merely authentic” magisterium. However, the fact that this assistance is habitual would seem to exclude such errors appearing habitually. This argument considers the habitual appearance of such errors over the last years as convergent evidence that the recent claimants have lacked this habitual assistance.
Cahiers de Cassiciacum Vol. I (Mgr Guérard des Lauriers)
The Problem of Authority in the Post-Conciliar Church : The Cassiciacum Thesis (Abbé Bernard Lucien)
Argument from the marks of the Church
This argument considers the four marks and properties of the Church, and whether they are verified in the body that has referred to itself as the Conciliar or Conciliar/Synodal Church and defined by recognition of Leo XIV and his recent predecessors.
‘Zero Marks’ – Why the Conciliar/Synodal Church is not the Catholic Church
This is, of course, subdivided into four further categories of arguments. For example, an argument from the unity of the Church might recall that the Pope is the “visible principle” and “efficient cause of unity” in the Church, in matters of faith and governance. He is so because his teaching is the proximate rule of faith, and his jurisdiction is supreme. But over the last decades, we have seen massive disunity in faith – even among those apparently submitting to the claimants – and an absence of governance in dealing with that disunity.
‘Totem Pope’—Does the mere election of a pope fulfill Christ’s promises?
A variation on this, combined with the argument from membership, considers the fact that the Church could not be said to be united if her members – especially her chief member – teach and profess heresy and a new and different “faith” to his predecessors and the rest of the Church.
What sort of heresy separates a man from the Church?
Similar arguments may be proposed for each of the other marks.
Argument from abductive reasoning
This looks at all of the problems to be explained – some of which we have already mentioned above – and infers the best explanation for the facts. It prioritizes explanations that enjoy simplicity, explanatory power, prior probability and normality. It also considers the significance of arguments or evidence converging on one particular conclusion: In this sense, even if someone is not convinced by the preceding arguments, the fact that they all point in the same direction is itself data for the abductive argument.
What’s the best explanation for the crisis in the Church?
References
1 Fortes in Fide, Vol 2, N. 1. Similar sentiments have been expressed by the late Abbé Philippe Guépin and the German priests behind the website antimodernist.org
2 On the other hand, distinguishing the seat and “seated” in the wrong way is a hallmark of another error, namely that of Gallicanism – and sedevacantists certainly cannot be accused of that. See here: The See and the Seated: Fr Dominic Palmieri SJ against Gallican theology of the Papacy
3 Cahiers de Cassiciacum vol. 3–4, n. 81b
4 n. 99c
5 It was proposed by St. Alphonsus Ligouri and St. Francis de Sales (making three doctors of the Church with St. Robert), as well as St. Antoninus, and too many theologians to name. Several Dominicans of the earlier school taught it (although they were in fact close to the “second position,” which held that even a secretly heretical Pope was deposed). Cardinal Cajetan held that such a one should be deposed, and Dominican theologians have followed him in more recent centuries, although he himself later wrote that he is automatically deposed, albeit in a form more in keeping with the “second opinion.” Cardinal Newman also expressed the Fifth Opinion in the Letter to the Duke of Norfolk. It was enshrined in positive law by Pope Paul IV in Cum ex apostolatus, and reaffirmed by Pope St. Pius V in Inter multiplices – and although those documents are no longer in force, the principles behind them were enshrined in Can. 188.4 of the 1917 Code. To my knowledge, no saints (and certainly no Doctors of the Church) held the contrary position.
6 As the non-sedevacantist Arnaldo da Silveira put it, Bellarmine adhered to the “first opinion” in a conditional way, and to the “fifth opinion” in a “conditional [alternative-successive] way”.
7 On the Roman Pontiff, Book II, XIX.
8 Summa de Ecclesia, Book II, Ch. 106
9 wmreview . org / p/torquemada?open=false#%C2%A73-resistance
10 “The sixteenth mode is when someone, in defense of heretical depravity, fabricates and defends new errors. This is clear, because such a person is not prepared to be corrected, nor does he seek the truth with careful solicitude. Therefore he is to be deemed pertinacious.” – Book IV, Pars II, Ch. XVI
11 Book IV, Part I, Ch. XI
12 Book II, Ch. CII
wmreview . org / p/palmieri-xxx-ii 13
14 Book IV, Ch. 4
15 in his De Ecclesia, Vol I, Book III, Ch. II.
16 This is clear from Bellarmine’s treatment of the canon. See more here.
17 In more precise terms, a judgment is “the second mental operation (…) by which the mind, comparing two ideas, notices their relation, and pronounces (judges) them in agreement or in disagreement.” (Glenn, Dialectics, p. xix). One might compare the idea of “an apple” and the idea of “fruit,” and then judge that “an apple is a fruit”.
18 Nicomachean Ethics, 3.5.
19 For more on this distinction, see Msgr. Guérard’s comments here.
20 Other possibilities include an election by an imperfect general council and/or the clergy of Rome. For more, see here.
21 This is well known to Archbishop Viganò, who has only recently published an essay offering his theoretical explanation of the crisis of our day.
22 “We are not of this new religion!”
23 “With the push for “synodality” we see that the enemies of Christ are putting before us, as Sheen says: “a new religion without a Cross, a liturgy without a world to come, a religion to destroy a religion, or a politics which is a religion – one that renders unto Caesar even the things that are God’s.”
Source:
Archbishop Viganò and the Seat of St. Peter: A …