The Summa of Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas volume 1
1. Is there science in God?
2. Does God know himself?
3. Is God's knowledge of himself comprehensive?
4. Is knowing God his very substance?
5. Does God know others?
6. Does God have his own knowledge of others?
7. Is the science of God discursive?
8. Is the knowledge of God the cause of things?
9. Does God have knowledge of things that are not?
10. Does God know about evils?
11. Does God know singulars?
12. Does God know an infinite number of things?
13. Does God know future contingents?
14. Does God know our sayings?
15. Is the science of God subject to change?
16. Does God have speculative knowledge of things, or practical knowledge?
Article 1 — Is there knowledge in God?
Objections:
1. It seems that there is no knowledge in God. Indeed, science is a habitus, and habitus has no place in God, because it holds the middle between power and act. Therefore there is no knowledge in God.
2 . Science, having conclusions as its object, is knowledge caused by something other than itself, namely by the knowledge of principles. But there is nothing caused in God. Therefore there is no knowledge in God.
3. All science is either general or particular. But in God, neither the general nor the particular meet, as was shown previously. Therefore there is no knowledge in God.
On the contrary , the Apostle writes (Rm 11:33): “O inexhaustible depth of the wisdom and knowledge of God! "
Answer :
In God there is knowledge, the most perfect there is. To be convinced of this, we must observe that beings endowed with knowledge are distinguished from non-knowers in that the latter have no other form than their own form; while the knowing being, by nature, has the capacity to receive, in addition, the form of something else: for the form of the known is in the knower. And it is evident from this that the nature of the non-knower is more restricted and more limited; that, on the contrary, of knowledge having a greater breadth and wider extension. Which made the Philosopher say that “the soul is in a certain way all things”. Now, it is by matter that the form is restricted, and this is why we said above that the forms, to the extent that they are more immaterial, reach a sort of infinity. We therefore see that the immateriality of a being is what makes it endowed with knowledge, and its degree of knowledge is measured by its immateriality. Also Aristotle explains, in the treatise On the Soul, that plants do not know because of their materiality. Sense is knowing because of its capacity to receive forms without matter; and the intellect knows to a still higher degree, because it is more separated from matter, and not mixed with it, says Aristotle. As God is at the summit of immateriality, as we have seen from the above, he is consequently at the summit of knowledge.
Solutions:
1 . Because the perfections which proceed from God in creatures are with him, in a superior mode, as was said above, when we attribute to God a name taken from some perfection of the creature, we must exclude from its meaning everything that relates to the imperfect mode specific to the creature. This is why knowledge in God is not a quality, or a habitus, but pure substance and act.
2. We have seen that what is divided and multiple in creatures is found in God simple and one. In man, according to the diversity of what is known, there are various kinds of knowledge: thus, “principles”, we say “intelligence”, “science”, according to whether he knows the conclusions; “wisdom,” according as he knows the supreme cause; “counsel” or “prudence,” according as he knows what to do. But God knows all these things with a simple and unique knowledge, as we will see. This is why the knowledge of God can receive absolutely all these names, on the condition that we exclude from each of them, when it is attributed to God, everything imperfect that it includes, and that we remember everything perfect. Thus it is written (Job 12:13): “In him reside wisdom and power; advice and intelligence belong to him. ”
3.Science borrows its characteristics from the way of being of the knowing subject, because the known object is in the one who knows it according to the way of being of the latter. Since the divine essence has a mode of being superior to that of creatures, divine science will not be like created science: neither universal nor particular, neither in habitual disposition, nor in power, nor in any other similar mode.
Article 2 - Does God know himself?
Objections:
1 . It seems that God does not know himself, for it is said in the Book of Causes: “Every being knowing its own essence returns to its essence by a complete return. ” Now God does not leave his own essence; it does not move in any way; he cannot therefore return, in order to know it, to its essence. So he doesn't know himself.
2. Knowing is a certain “to suffer”, a “being moved”, as it is said in the book On the Soul; science is still an assimilation of the mind to the thing known; finally, what we know is a perfection of the one who knows. Now, no one suffers from himself, no one perfects himself, no one is similar to himself, as S. Hilaire observes.
3 . We are similar to God especially through intelligence, because it is the spirit, says S. Augustine, which makes us in the image of God. But our intellect cannot know itself, except by knowing other things, as the book On the Soul states. So God does not know himself either, except perhaps by knowing something other than himself.
On the contrary , the Apostle writes (1 Cor 2:11): “No one knows the things concerning God except the Spirit of God. "
Answer :
God knows himself, and he knows himself. To understand this, you must know that if, in the case of operations which extend to an external effect, the object of the operation, that is to say its term, is something external to the operating subject, on the contrary, when it comes to operations which are in the operating subject itself, the object in which the operation ends is in the operating subject, and in this itself the operation consists: that the object is in the subject. Also it is said in the book On the Soul that the sensible in act is identical to the sense in act, and that the intelligible in act is identical to the intellect in act. Because to feel or know something intellectually in action comes from the fact that our intellect or our sense is currently informed by the force of the sensible or the intelligible. And if sense or intelligence differ from sensible or intelligible, it is only when they are both potentially. Therefore, as in God nothing is potential, but he is pure act, it is necessary that in him the intellect and the object of the intellect are identical in every way; so that it is never devoid of intelligible form, like us when we only know potentially; and that, on the other hand, the intelligible form is not distinct from the very substance of the divine intellect, as happens with our intellect when it is actually knowing. Consequently, the intelligible form spoken of is the divine intellect itself, and thus it knows itself through itself.
Solutions:
l. To return to one's own essence is simply to subsist within oneself. In fact, form, insofar as it perfects matter by giving it being, spreads in some way throughout this matter. But insofar as it has being in itself, it returns to itself. Therefore, the non-existent cognitive faculties, but which are the act of bodily organs, do not know themselves, as we see from our various senses. On the contrary, self-subsisting cognitive faculties can know themselves. This is what the Book of Causes declares when it says: “He who knows his own essence returns to his essence. ” Now, subsisting by oneself is supremely the case of God. Therefore, according to this way of speaking, we must say that God also sovereignly returns to his essence, and knows himself.
2. “To be moved”, “to suffer”, these words are taken equivocally when we say that intellection is a “being moved”, a “to suffer”, as Aristotle explains in the book On the Soul. Because knowing intellectually is not a movement, which is the act of the imperfect, that is to say a passage from potency to act; it is an act of the perfect, that is to say an act which remains in the agent. Likewise, whether the intellect is actuated by the intelligible, or whether it becomes assimilated to it, this suits the intellect to which it happens to be in potential. Being in potency, it differs from its intelligible and is assimilated to it by an intelligible form, which is the similarity of the thing known, and it derives its perfection from it, as potency is perfected by the act. But the divine intellect, which is in no way potential, is not perfected by the intelligible, it is not assimilated to it; he is himself his own perfection and his own intelligibility.
3. Prime matter, which is pure power, is only capable of natural being to the extent that it is actualized by form. Now, our passive intellect is in the order of the intelligible what first matter is in the order of natural things, because it is in potential with regard to intelligibles like first matter with regard to things. natural. It follows that our passive intellect can only know intelligibles if it is actualized by an intelligible form. And thus he knows himself, as he knows everything else, by means of an intelligible form; for it is evident that, knowing an intelligible object, he knows his own intellection, and by this act he knows his intellectual power. But God is pure act both in the order of knowledge and in the order of existence, and this is why he knows himself by himself.
Article 3 - Is God's knowledge of himself comprehensive?
Objections:
1. It does not seem so, because S. Augustine writes: “A being who understands himself is finished for himself. ” Now, God is infinite in any case: therefore he cannot understand himself.
2. If we say: God is infinite for us, although finite for himself, we can further object: What is true for God is truer than what is true for us. Therefore, if God is finite for himself, it is more true to say: God is finite, than to say: God is infinite. However, this contradicts everything that has been determined above. So God does not understand himself.
In the opposite direction , S. Augustine writes in the same place: “Every being who knows himself intellectually understands himself. "
Answer :
God has comprehensive knowledge of himself, and here is the proof. A thing is said to be understood when one has reached the extreme limit of its knowledge, and this happens when this thing is known as perfectly as it is knowable. For example, a demonstrable proposition is understood when it is known by demonstration, not when it is known by a merely plausible reason. Now it is manifest that God knows himself perfectly as he is perfectly knowable. Indeed, each being is knowable to the extent that it is in act; for we do not know a thing according to whether it is potentially, but according to whether it is actually, as is said in Metaphysics. Now, the cognitive virtue of God equals the actuality of his being, because, if God is knowing, this comes from the fact that he is in act and free from all matter, from all potentiality, as has been shown . It is therefore evident that he knows himself as much as he is knowable. And that’s why it makes perfect sense.
Solutions:
l. Taken in full terms, “to understand” means to have in itself and to include something. Thus, everything that is “understood” is necessarily finite like everything that is included. But when we say of God that he is understood by himself, we do not mean that his intellect is other than his being, that he takes it into himself and includes it. Such expressions must be interpreted negatively. Just as we say: God is in himself to say that he is not contained by anything external, so we say that he understands himself to express that nothing of himself escapes him. This is what makes St. Augustine say: “A thing is understood when we see it in such a way that nothing of it escapes the one who sees. ”
2. When we say: God is finite for himself, this must only be understood as a sort of equality of proportion, and this means: God does not exceed the capacity of his own intelligence any more than a being finite is beyond the capacity of a finite mind. But we do not understand that God is finite for himself in the sense that he himself would understand himself as finite.
Article 4 — Is knowing God his very substance?
Objections:
1. It seems not. Because knowing is an operation. Now, an operation means something which proceeds from an operant. Therefore the knowledge of God is not its very substance.
2 . To know that one knows is not to know something important, principal, but something secondary and accessory. Therefore, if God is identical with his intellection, knowing will be for God as knowing us that we know, and knowing God will be nothing great.
3.To know is to know something. Therefore, when God knows himself, if he himself is nothing other than his own knowledge, he knows only his knowledge, and so to infinity. It is therefore not possible that the knowledge of God is his substance.
In the opposite sense , S. Augustine affirms:
“For God, to be is to be wise. ”To be wise, here, is to know. Therefore, for God, to be is to know by intelligence. Now, we saw above that the being of God is identical to his substance; therefore, intellection, in God, is identical to his substance.
Answer:
We must necessarily say that knowing Him, in God, is identical to His substance. For if the intellection of God were distinct from his substance, it would follow, according to the Philosopher in book XII of the Metaphysics, that this divine substance would find its act and its perfection in something other than itself, in view of which it would maintain the relation of power to an act, which is quite impossible, because knowing it is the perfection and the act of the knower.
How this is done must be examined. We said above that intellection is not an action leaving the agent and passing into something external, but that it remains in him as his actuality and his perfection, in the way in which being even is the perfection of the existing. Indeed, as being is consecutive to form, so intellection is consecutive to intelligible form. But in God there is no form other than his very being, as has been shown. It therefore necessarily results from its very essence being intelligible form, as has also been said _ that its knowing itself is both its essence and its being.
From all of the above it follows that in God, the intellect, the known, the intelligible form and knowing itself are absolutely one and the same thing. Obviously, therefore, saying of God that he knows does not introduce any multiplicity into his substance.
Solutions:
1 . Intellection is not an operation leaving the operant, but it remains within him.
2 . To know the knowing which is not subsistent is not to know much, as when we know our own knowing. But the same is not true of divine knowledge, which is subsistent.
3. Divine knowledge, which is subsisting in itself, is knowledge of itself, and not of something else which must be pursued indefinitely.
Article 5 – Does God know others?
Objections:
1.It seems that God does not know others. For everything other than God is external to Him. Now S. Augustine tells us: “God sees nothing outside himself. ”So he doesn’t know the others.
2. The known is the perfection of the knower. Therefore, if God knows others, something else will be his perfection, and will be nobler than him. Which is impossible.
3. Intellection is specified by the intelligible, as any other act is specified by its object; and hence it is that knowing it is all the more noble as the thing known is nobler. Now, God is himself his own intellection, as we have said. Therefore, if God knows something other than himself, God himself is specified by something else, which is impossible. He therefore does not know things other than himself.
On the contrary , we read in the epistle to the Hebrews (4:13): “All things are bare and open before his eyes.”
Answer:
It is absolutely necessary to say that God knows others. It is manifest, in fact, that he knows himself perfectly, without which his being would not be perfect, since his being is his knowing. Now, if something is known perfectly, its power must be known perfectly. But the power of an agent cannot be known perfectly without knowing the things to which this power extends. As God's power extends to others, since he is the first efficient cause of all things, as demonstrated previously, it is therefore absolutely necessary that God knows others. This becomes even more evident if we add that the very being of the first cause, which is God, is his knowledge, and that all things are in him in the same way that the intelligible is in the intellect. For everything that is in another is always there according to the proper mode of the one in whom it is.
To know how God thus knows others, we must note that there are two ways for a thing to be known: in itself, and in another. We know a thing in itself when we know it by means of its own intelligible form, adequate to it, as when the eye sees a man by the sensible form, in it, of this man. On the contrary, we know in another what we see by the specific cognitive form of that which contains it, as when we see a part of a whole by the cognitive form of the whole, or a man in a mirror by the image which this mirror gives, or in any other way in which one thing can be seen in another.
From this, it must be said that God sees himself in himself, since he sees himself by his own essence. But as for other beings, he does not see them in themselves, he sees them in himself, according as his essence has in it the similarity of everything that is other than himself.
Solutions:
1 . When S. Augustine writes: “God sees nothing outside of himself,” we must not understand that he would not see anything that is outside of himself, but rather that what is outside of himself himself, he only sees or looks at it in himself, as we have just explained.
2 . If the known is the perfection of the knower, it is not through its substance, but through its intelligible form, according to which it is found in the intellect as its form and its perfection. “It is not the stone,” says Aristotle, “that is in the soul, but its form. ” As for realities other than God, they are known by God according to whether his essence includes their intelligible forms as we have just seen. It does not therefore follow that another reality is the perfection of the divine intellect, apart from the divine essence.
3 . Intellectual vision is not specified by what is seen in another, but by the principal known in which other things are known. Knowing it, in fact, is specified by its object because the intelligible form is the principle of the intellectual operation; because every operation is specified by the form which is the principle of this operation, as heating is specified by heat. The intellectual operation receives its species from the intelligible form which makes the intellect in action. And this intelligible form is that of the principal known which, in God, is none other than his very essence, in which all the representative forms of beings are understood. It is therefore not necessary that divine intellection, or rather God himself, be specified by anything other than the essence of God.
Article 6 - Does God have his own knowledge of realities other than himself?
Objections:
1 . It does not seem so, because God knows all things, as we have just seen, as they are in himself. But the other things are in God as in the first and universal cause. Therefore, they are also known to him as in their first and universal cause, and this is knowing in general, not with specific knowledge. Therefore God knows other things in general, not with knowledge specific to each one.
2 . The divine essence is distant from the essence of the creature as much as the essence of the creature is from it. Now, through the essence of the creature, the divine essence cannot be known. And thus, God knowing nothing except by his essence, it follows that he does not know the creature in its essence, so as to know “what it is”, which is to have specific knowledge of it. .
3. We can only properly know a thing through our own formal reason. But God knows all things by his essence. It therefore seems that he does not know each thing by its own formal reason, because the same cannot be the formal reason of multiple and diverse things. God therefore does not have specific knowledge of things, but general knowledge.
In the opposite sense , to have one's own knowledge of things is to know them not only in general, but according to how they are distinguished from one another. Now, this is how God knows things, according to these words from the Epistle to the Hebrews (4,12): “It goes (the word of God) so far as to distinguish the soul and the spirit, the joints and the marrow; it unravels the feelings and thoughts of the heart. Therefore no creature is hidden from God. ”
Answer:
In this regard, some philosophers have gone astray, saying that God only knows other realities in general, that is to say insofar as they are beings. In the same way, in fact, that fire, if it knew itself as the principle of heat, would know the nature of heat and, with it, all other hot things, as hot: thus God, in as long as he knows himself as the principle of being, knows the nature of being and of all other things insofar as they are beings. But this cannot be. Indeed, to know something in general and not in its distinct aspects is to know it imperfectly. Also our intelligence, when it passes from potency to act, it first accesses a general and confused knowledge of things, before having a specific knowledge of them, thus going from the imperfect to the perfect, said Aristotle. Therefore, if the knowledge that God has of things other than himself were only general and not distinct, it would follow that his intellection would not in any case be perfect, nor, consequently, his being itself, which contradicts our previous determinations. It is therefore necessary to affirm that God knows realities other than himself with his own knowledge, not only according to whether they have in common the formal reason for being, but according to whether they are distinguished from one another.
To highlight this, it must be observed that some, wishing to show that God knows multiple things, use comparisons like these: the center of a circle, if it knew itself, would know all the lines which start from him; light, if it knew itself, would know all the colors. But these examples, although they are valid on one point, namely as to universal causality, are deficient in that the multitude and diversity which they envisage are not caused by this single universal principle in that which distinguishes them , but only in what is common to them. Thus, the diversity of colors is not caused by light alone, but by the disposition of the environment which receives it; similarly, the diversity of the radii of the circle comes from their diverse positions. Hence it follows that this diversity or multitude cannot be known in its unique principle of proper knowledge, but only in general. But in God it is not so. As we have shown above, all that there is of perfection, in whatever creature it may be, pre-exists and is contained in God in a supereminent way. And in creatures there is not only what they have in common, namely their being, which belongs to their perfection, there is also that by which they differ from each other, such as living, knowing, and the other characteristics by which the living and the non-living, the intelligent and the non-intelligent are distinguished. And every form by which any thing whatsoever is constituted into its own species is a perfection. Thus, all things preexist in God not only as to what is common to all, but also as to what distinguishes them. Consequently, God containing in himself all perfections, the essence of God maintains with the essences of all things not the relationship of the common to the proper, of unity to numbers or of the center to the divergent lines, but the relationship of the perfect act to imperfect acts, as if I were to say: from man to animal, or from six, a whole number, to the fractions it contains. Now, it is clear that through the perfect act we can know imperfect acts not only in general, but with specific knowledge. He who knows the number six knows its half: three, with his own knowledge.
Therefore, as his essence includes all that is perfect in the essence of anything else, and much more, God can know all things in himself with his own knowledge. For the proper nature of any being has consistency according to whether it participates in some way in divine perfection. Now God would not know himself perfectly if he did not know all the ways in which his perfection can be shared by others. And the very nature of being would not be perfectly known to him if he did not know all the modes of being. It is therefore manifest that God knows all things with his own knowledge, according as each is distinguished from the others.
Solutions:
1. Knowing a thing as it is in the knowing subject can be understood in two ways. Or the adverb “like” means the mode of knowledge from the point of view of the thing known, and then it is false. For the knower does not always know the known according to the being he has in him; the eye does not know the stone as to the being it has in it; but, by the intentional form of the stone which he has within him, he knows the stone as it is outside the eye. And when a knower knows what he knows according to the being which he has within him, he knows it no less also according to the being which he has outside of him. Thus the intellect knows the stone according to the intelligible being that it has in it, insofar as it reflects on its act; but at the same time he knows the being of the stone in its own nature. But, if the adverb “like” means the mode of knowledge from the point of view of the knower, then it is true that the knower only knows the known insofar as it is in him; for the mode of knowing is all the more perfect as the known is more perfectly in the knower.
Consequently , we must say this: God not only knows that things are in him, but, because he contains them in himself, he contains them according to their own nature, and all the more perfectly the more perfectly each is in him.
2 . The essence of the creature is to the essence of God what the imperfect act is to the perfect act. Thus the being of the creature cannot suffice to lead to knowledge of the divine essence; but the opposite is true.
3. The same cannot be taken as a formal reason for various things if it is equal to each. But the divine essence is something that transcends all creatures. This is why we can see in it the formal reason for all things, being participatory and imitable by all creatures, each in its own way.
Article 7 – Is the science of God discursive?
Objections:
l.It seems that the science of God is discursive. In fact, the knowledge of God does not designate a habitual disposition, but a current intellection. Now, the Philosopher tells us that, if we can know many things simultaneously in a habitual way, we can only actually know one. Therefore, as God knows many things, knowing both himself and everything else, as has been shown, it seems that he does not know all things at once, but that he passes from one object to the other in a discursive way.
2 . To know the effect through the cause is to know discursively. But God knows everything else by himself, as the effect by its cause. So his knowledge is discursive.
3. God knows each creature more perfectly than we can know it; but we know in the created causes their effects, and thus we proceed discursively from causes to effects. It therefore seems that the same is true for God.
In the opposite sense , S. Augustine writes: “God sees all things not one by one and through an alternate look, as if he saw here then there; he sees everything at once. ”
Answer:
In divine science, there is nothing discursive, and here is the proof. In our science we find a double discursive process. One according to succession, as when, after considering one thing, we pass to the consideration of another. The other, according to causality: as when, by virtue of principles, we arrive at knowledge of conclusions. The first discursive process cannot suit God; for we ourselves, who successively conceive diverse things when we consider each in itself, we know them together if we know them all in a single medium; for example, when we know the parts in the whole, and when we see various objects in the mirror. Now God sees everything in a single medium, which is himself, as has been established. He therefore sees all things together, and not successively. Similarly, the second discursive process cannot suit God. First of all because this second meaning presupposes the first; for those who pass from premises to conclusions do not consider them together. Then because this approach goes from the known to the unknown; it is therefore clear that, once the first term is known, the other is still unknown, and the second is then not known “in” the first, but “from” the first. The end of the process occurs when the second term is seen in the first, the effects being resolved in the causes; but then the discursive approach ceases. Therefore, since God sees his effects in himself as in their cause, his knowledge is not discursive.
Solutions:
1.Although the actual knowing is one in itself, yet it happens that, in a single knowing, many knowns are attained, as has just been said.
2. God does not first know the cause, then and through it its initially unknown effects: he knows the effects in the cause, as has just been said.
3 . God sees, much better than we, the effects of the causes created in the causes themselves; but the knowledge of these effects is not caused in him by the knowledge of created causes, as is the case with us, and his science is therefore not discursive.
Article 8 - Is the knowledge of God the cause of things?
Objections:
1 . It seems not, for Origen says this: “It is not because God knows that a thing must one day be that that thing will be; but because it must be, God knows in advance that it will be. ”
2 . Once the cause is established, the effect is also established. But the knowledge of God is eternal. So, if God's science were the cause of created things, it seems that creatures would exist for all eternity.
3 . The knowable precedes science, and measurement, says Aristotle. But what is thus posterior and measured cannot be cause.
In the opposite sense , S. Augustine writes: “God does not know the universality of spiritual or corporeal creatures because they are; but they are because he knows them. "
Answer :
The knowledge of God is the cause of things; for the knowledge of God is with regard to created things what the knowledge of the artisan is with regard to his works. Now, the knowledge of the artisan is indeed the cause of what he produces, from the fact that he acts by his intelligence, and that consequently the intelligible form is the principle of his operation, as heat is the principle of warming up. However, it must be considered that the natural form is not called the principle of action insofar as it is immanent in what it brings into existence, but rather insofar as it is ordered to the effect. Likewise, the intelligible form is not called the principle of action simply by the fact that it is the intelligible form in the knower, if it is not completed by an ordination to the effect, which comes from the will. . Indeed, as the intelligible form is indifferent with regard to one or the other of the opposites (since it is the same science which considers the opposites), it would not produce a determinate effect, if itself was not determined towards him by appetite. This is what Aristotle explains. Now, it is manifest that God causes all things by his intelligence, since his being and his intellection are identical. It is therefore necessary to say that his knowledge is the cause of things, jointly with his will. This is why the science of God, considered as the cause of things, is usually called “science of approval”.
Solutions:
1. Origen only considered the aspect of knowledge here, and we said that knowledge is not cause independently of the will. But when he says that God foresees such things because they are to come, we must understand this “because” of a logical, not ontological, causality. This consequence is exact, in fact: if it is true of a thing that it will be, it is true that God has foreseen it; but future things are not the cause of God knowing them.
2 . The knowledge of God is the cause of things according to the way in which these things are in it. Now it has not been in the knowledge of God that things have always been. Although the knowledge of God is eternal, it does not follow that creatures have always existed.
3 . Natural things are intermediate between the science of God and ours; for we draw our knowledge from those same natural things of which the knowledge of God is the cause. And therefore, just as natural knowables are prior to our knowledge and measure it, so God's knowledge is prior to natural things and measures them. Thus, a house is intermediate between the science of the architect who built it, and the science of the observer who becomes aware of it after its construction.
Article 9 - Whether God has knowledge of things which are not?
Objections:
1. It seems not, because there is no knowledge in God except of true things, and there is a reciprocal attribution between the true and the being. Therefore there is no knowledge of non-beings in God.
2 . Knowledge requires a similarity between the one who knows and what he knows. But what is not cannot have any resemblance to God, who is being itself. Therefore what is not cannot be known by God.
3 . The knowledge of God is the cause of things. But it is not the cause of non-beings, because non-being has no cause. Therefore God does not have knowledge of what is not.
On the contrary , the Apostle writes (Rm 4:17): God “calls those things which are not, as those which are”.
Answer:
God knows all things, whatever they may be. Now nothing prevents things which, purely and simply, do not exist from nevertheless being in some way. Are purely and simply those which are in action. Those which are not in act are in potential: in the power of God or that of the creature, whether it is active power or passive power, or the power to think, to imagine, to express in any way. All things, therefore, which can be done, thought or said by the creature, and also all those which he himself can do, God knows them, even if they are not in act. In this sense, we can say that he has knowledge of non-beings.
But among the things that are not in action, we must note a diversity. Some, although not presently existing, have been or will be, and these God is said to know by a “science of vision”; as the knowledge of God, which is his very being, has as its measure eternity, which, being itself without succession, encompasses the totality of time, the gaze of God, eternally present, bears on the totality of time, and on all things which are in any part of time, as on realities which are present to it. Others, which are not in act, are in the power of God or of the creature, and yet are not, nor will be, nor have ever been. With regard to these, God is said to have not a science of vision, but a science of “simple intelligence”. And we express ourselves this way because, among us, the things we see have their own being apart from the subject who sees.
Solutions:
1. Things which are not in actuality have their truth as things in potential, because it is true that they are in potential. And this is how God knows them.
2.God being Himself, to the extent that a thing is, it participates in its likeness, just as a hot thing, to the extent that it is hot, participates in heat. And so the things which are in potential, although they are not in act, are known to God.
3. The knowledge of God is only the cause of things if his will is added to it. It is therefore not necessary that everything God knows exists, has existed, or must one day exist, but only that which He wills or permits to exist. And, once again, what is in the knowledge of God is not that these things are, but that they can be.
Article 10 – Does God have knowledge of evils?
Objections:
1. It seems that he does not know evils because, according to Aristotle, an intellect which is not in power does not know privation; but evil, according to S. Augustine, is the deprivation of good. As divine intelligence is never in potential, but always in act, as we have seen, it seems that God does not know evil.
2. All science is the cause of what it knows, or is caused by it. Now the knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; nor is it caused by him. Therefore there is no knowledge of evils in God.
3. What we know, we know either by its similar or by its opposite. Now, everything that God knows, he knows by its essence, as has been shown. And the divine essence does not resemble evil and does not have evil as its opposite, because it has no opposite, affirms S. Augustine.
4. That which is known by something else is not known by itself and is therefore not known perfectly. Now evil is not known to God in itself, because for that evil would have to be in God; in fact, the known must be in the knower. And if evil is known to God through something else, namely through good, it will be known to Him imperfectly, which is impossible, because no knowledge in God is imperfect. Therefore God has no knowledge of evils.
On the contrary , we read in the book of Proverbs (15, 11): “Hell and perdition are in the presence of the Lord. "
Answer :
He who knows something perfectly must know all the accidents that can happen to him. Now there are good things which can be damaged by evils. God would therefore not know good things in perfection if he did not also know evil. But any thing is knowable to the extent that it is. As the being of evil is only the privation of good, by this alone that God knows good things, he also knows evils, as we know darkness by light. This is what makes Dionysius say: “God brings from himself the sight of darkness; it is not otherwise than through light that he knows them. ”
Solutions:
1. The Philosopher means that the intellect which is not in potential does not know privation by means of a privation which would be in it. For he had previously said that the point, or any other indivisible, is known only by the privation of division. The reason is that simple and indivisible forms are not actually in our intelligence, but only potentially; if they were in action, we would not know them through the detour of deprivation. Now it is thus, without detour, and without using deprivation, that separated substances know simple realities. God therefore does not know evil through a deprivation existing in him, but through its opposite, good.
2. The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil, but of the good thing through which evil is known.
3 . Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence, which is not corruptible, it is nevertheless opposed to the works of God: God knows this by its essence and, knowing them, he knows the opposite evils.
4. To know something indirectly is to know it imperfectly, if they are things knowable by themselves. But evil is not knowable by itself; because what characterizes evil is being deprived of good; and thus it cannot be defined or known, except through the medium of good.
Article 11 — Does God know singulars?
Objections:
1 . It does not seem so, because divine intelligence is more immaterial than human intelligence; now, human intelligence, because of its immateriality, does not know singulars, because it is said in the book On the Soul: “Reason knows the universal; the senses, the singular ones. ”
2 . The only faculties in us which know singulars are those which receive the non-abstract intentional forms of material conditions. But things in God are abstracted as much as possible from all materiality. Therefore God does not know singulars.
3. All knowledge is made by means of a similarity. Now, the similarity of singular beings, precisely as singular, does not seem to be able to be in God; for the principle of the singularity of beings is matter, and matter, being only potentially, is entirely unlike God, who is pure act. Therefore God does not know singulars.
On the contrary , we read in the book of Proverbs (16, 2): “All the ways of man are laid bare before his eyes. ”
Answer:
God knows singulars. Indeed, all the perfections found in creatures pre-exist in God in a more excellent way, as we have shown above. Now, knowing singulars belongs to our perfection. It is therefore necessary that God knows them. Aristotle considers it unacceptable that something is known by us and is not known by God. This is why, arguing against Empedocles, he counters that God would be very imperfect if he ignored discord. However, the perfections which are divided in lower things are found in God in simple and one form. This is why, while we know the universals which are immaterial by one faculty, and the material singulars by another, God, he, by his one and simple intellect knows both.
But how this can be done, some, to show it, have said that God knows singulars by universal causes, because there is nothing in the singular which does not come from some universal cause. And they give this example: if an astronomer knew in their universal principles all the movements of the sky, he could announce all future eclipses. But this is not enough. For particular beings receive from general causes certain forms of being and certain powers of action; but, however close to the concrete their conjunction may be, these powers and these forms are never made individual except in and by individual matter. Also, he who knows Socrates because he is white, because he is the son of Sophroniscus, or by some other characteristic of this kind, would not know Socrates according to whether he is that man. We therefore see that, in the manner indicated, God would not know singulars in their singularity.
Others have said that God knows singulars by applying universal causes to their singular effects. But that means nothing, because no one can apply one thing to another unless he first knows that one. Therefore, the application in question cannot be the explanatory reason for the knowledge of singulars, which it presupposes.
We must therefore speak differently. God being the cause of things through his science, as has been said, the science of God has the same extension as his causality. And as the active virtue of God does not extend only to the forms from which the universal is released, but to matter itself, as will be shown, it is therefore of all necessity that the science of God extends to singulars, which derive their individuality from matter. Indeed, as God knows others through his own essence, insofar as this essence is the similarity of things, or even their efficient principle, it is necessary that his essence suffices to make him know all the things which are made by him, and this not only in their universal nature, but also in their singularity. This would be the case with the science of the artisan himself, if it produced the whole thing, instead of only giving it its form.
Solutions:
1 . Through abstraction, our intellect releases the intelligible form of the individuating principles of its object. It follows that this intelligible form cannot be the similarity of individual characteristics, and it is for this reason that our intellect does not know the singular. But the intelligible form of the divine intellect, which is the essence of God, is not immaterial by abstraction; it is by itself, and it is from it that all the constituent principles of the thing come, those of specific nature or those of individuation. Through it, God can therefore know not only universals, but also singulars.
2 . Although the intelligible form of the divine intellect does not in itself comprehend material conditions, as it is with the cognitive forms in imagination and in sense, yet, by its realizing virtue, it also extends and to immaterial things and to material things, as we have just said.
3 . Although matter departs from resemblance to God by reason of its potentiality, yet inasmuch as, even thus, it has being, it retains a certain resemblance to divine being.
Article 12 — Does God know an infinity of things?
Objections:
1 . It seems that God cannot know an infinite number of things. Indeed, infinity as such is unknown: according to Aristotle's formula, it is “that of which one can always take more, whatever the quantity already taken”. S. Augustine also says “What is embraced by science becomes finished by the understanding of him who knows it. ” Now, the infinite cannot become finite.
2. We may say: what is infinite in itself is finite for the science of God. But then, here's the objection. The very nature of the infinite is that it cannot be traversed, as it is said in Aristotle's Physics. But the infinite cannot be traversed either by the finite or by the infinite, which is proven by the same work. Therefore infinity cannot be limited, not even by infinity. And so the infinity of things is not included in the science of God, even if it is infinite.
3 . The knowledge of God is the measure of what God knows; but it is contrary to the nature of infinity for infinity to be measured.
In the opposite sense , S. Augustine expresses himself thus: “Although infinite numbers are without number, they do not escape him whose knowledge is without number. ”
Answer:
Given that God knows not only what is in act, but also what is contained in his power or in that of the creature, as has been shown, and since these possibilities are obviously infinite in number , it is necessary to admit that God knows an infinity of things. As for the science of vision, which has for its object only those things which are, or will be, or have been, although some say that it does not embrace an infinity of objects, since we do not admit that the world has always been, nor that generation and movement must last without end, so that individuals would be multiplied to infinity, however, if we look more closely, we must necessarily say that God, even by his science of vision, knows an infinity of things. For God knows even the thoughts and affections of the hearts, which will in the future be multiplied to infinity, since rational creatures must last without end.
Here is why: the knowledge of an object extends as far as the form which is the principle of knowledge in it allows. The sensible cognitive form, in the sense, represents only one individual; it follows that by this form only one individual can be known. On the contrary, the intelligible form, in our mind, represents the thing in terms of its specific nature, a nature which can be participated by an infinity of particular things. Hence it is that our intellect, by means of the concept of man, knows, as it were, an infinity of men. He does not know them according to whether they are distinguished from one another, but according to whether they have a specific nature in common. This is because the intelligible form, in us, does not represent men in terms of their individual principles, it only represents the constituent principles of the species. But the divine essence, by which the divine intellect knows, is a sufficient representation of all things which are or can be, not only as to the principles common to many, but also as to that which is proper to each, as well as we showed it. It follows that the knowledge of God extends to an infinite quantity of things, even as they are distinct from one another.
Solutions:
1 . According to the Philosopher, infinity concerns quantity. And the formal reason of quantity involves an order between the parts. Consequently, to know the infinite according to the proper mode of the infinite is to know it part by part, and in this way the infinite escapes all knowledge; for whatever number of parts we can embrace, some will remain out of reach indefinitely. But God does not know the infinite, or objects in infinite number by enumerating, as it were, part by part; we have explained that he knows through simultaneous, not successive, knowledge. Nothing therefore opposes, as far as it is concerned, the knowledge of an infinity of objects.
2 . A crossing presupposes a succession of parts, and hence the infinite cannot be traversed, neither by the finite nor by the infinite. On the contrary, the formal reason for understanding only requires adequacy to what is understood, because we call “understood” that of which nothing remains external to that which understands it. The formal reason for the infinite therefore does not exclude that it is understood by an infinite. And thus, what is infinite in itself can be finite for the science of God, in the sense that it is included therein, but not in the sense that it would be traversed or traversed.
3.The knowledge of God is indeed the measure of things; but it is not a quantitative measure, and it is from such a measure that things in infinite number escape. The science of God measures the essence and truth of each thing, for each thing participates in the truth of its nature to the extent that it conforms to the science of God: like the work of art which accords with the art itself. Supposing therefore that there are in fact an infinite number of beings, for example an infinity of men; or even if there is an infinity in extent, like the air, according to ancient philosophers, it is manifest that the being of each thing would be no less determined and finite, because it would be confined within the limits of certain particular natures; these things would therefore be measurable with regard to the knowledge of God.
Article 13 — Does God know future contingents?
Objections:
1. It seems not. Indeed, a necessary cause produces a necessary effect. But the knowledge of God is the cause of what it knows, as we have said. As the knowledge of God is necessary, so must its object be. The science of God therefore does not reach contingents.
2 . In any conditional proposition, if the antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is also absolutely necessary; for the antecedent is to the consequent what the principles are to the conclusion, and the Latest Analytics teach us that, from necessary principles, only necessary conclusions can flow. Now this conditional proposition is true: If God knew that it is to come, it will be; for the knowledge of God is always true. And the antecedent of this proposition is absolutely necessary, first of all because it is eternal; then because it is expressed in the past tense. Therefore the consequent is also absolutely necessary. And thus everything that is known by God is necessary, so that there is no knowledge of contingents in God.
3 . Everything that is known by God necessarily exists, since even everything that is known by us necessarily exists, whereas God's knowledge is more certain than our knowledge. However, no contingent future necessarily exists. Therefore no contingent future is known by God.
In the opposite sense , the Psalm (33:15) says of God with regard to men: “He forms the heart of each; he knows all their actions. ” However, the actions of men are contingent, since they depend on their free will. God therefore knows the future contingents.
Answer :
As we have shown above that God knows all things, not only those which are in act, but also those which are in his power or in the power of the creature, and as certain things among the latter are future contingents for us , it follows that God knows the future contingents.
To clearly establish this conclusion, it must be observed that a contingent can be considered from two aspects. First in itself, when it has already occurred, and then it is no longer considered as future, but as present; nor as capable of being or not being, but as determined to one branch of the alternative. For this reason, it can, taken thus, fall infallibly under certain knowledge, under the sense of sight, for example as when I see Socrates sitting. In another way, the contingent can be considered as it is in its cause. In this aspect it is considered future and contingent, not yet determined to be or not to be, to be this or that, because the contingent cause is that which can do this or its opposite. In this case the contingent cannot be known with certainty. Consequently, he who knows a contingent effect only in its cause, has only conjectural knowledge of it. But God knows all contingents not only as they are in their causes, but also according to whether each of them is actually realized in itself.
And, although the contingents are realized successively, God does not know them in themselves successively like us, but simultaneously. For his knowledge, as much as his being, has eternity as its measure; but eternity, which is all at once, encompasses the totality of time, as has been said. In this way, everything that is in time is eternally present to God, not only insofar as God has present in his mind the formal reasons for all things, as some claim, but because his gaze is eternally on all things, as they are present.
It is therefore manifest that the contingents are infallibly known to God as present under the divine gaze in their presence, and yet, in relation to their own causes, they remain future contingents.
Solutions:
1 . Even if the remote cause is necessary, the effect can be contingent because of the proximate cause, if it is contingent. Thus the germination of a plant is a contingent effect due to its proximate cause, although the proximate cause of this germination, the solar movement, is a necessary cause. Likewise, the contingent causes which God knows are contingent by reason of their proximate causes, although the knowledge of God, which is their first cause, is a necessary cause.
2.Some say that this antecedent: God knew that such a contingent fact will be, is not necessary, but contingent, because, although it is past, it relates to the future. But that does not prevent it from being necessary because, what had a relation to the future, it is necessary that it had it, even if sometimes this future does not arrive.
Others say that the antecedent in question is contingent, because it is composed of necessity and contingency, like this proposition: Socrates is a white man, is a contingent proposition. But that also means nothing, because when we say: “God knew that such and such a contingent thing will be,” “contingent” appears in the proposition only as the material element of the affirmation, not as its principal element; so that this contingency, as well as the necessity which could be substituted for it, does not make the proposition necessary or contingent, true or false. Thus, it may be true that I said: “man is an ass,” as well as: “Socrates runs,” or: “God is.” It is the same if I speak of necessity or contingency.
It must therefore be recognized that this antecedent is absolutely necessary. Some say that it does not follow that the consequent is absolutely necessary, because the antecedent is a distant cause of the consequent, and this consequent is contingent by reason of its proximate cause. But this proves nothing, because a conditional proposition whose antecedent would be a necessary remote cause, and the consequent a contingent effect, would be a false proposition, as if I said: “If the sun moves, the grass will germinate. ”
We must therefore express ourselves differently and say this: When, in the antecedent, we introduce something relating to an operation of the mind, the consequent must be understood not according to real being, such as it is. in itself, but according to the intentional being that it has in the mind. Other, in fact, is the being of a thing in itself, other its being in the mind. For example, when I say: “If the soul knows something, this something is immaterial,” we must understand that it is immaterial in the intellect, not according to its real being. Likewise, when I say: “If God knew anything, it will be,” the consequent must be understood of the being according to which the thing is present. Thus understood, it is necessary as well as the antecedent, because “what is, when it is, it is necessary that it be,” according to Aristotle.
3.Things that come to pass temporally are known successively by us in time, but by God in eternity, who is above time. Consequently, because we know future contingents as such, they cannot be certain for us; but for God alone, whose knowledge is in eternity, who transcends time. It is like someone who walks on a path and does not see those who follow him, whereas a man posted on a height, looking down the whole path, sees at the same time all those who pass by it. Thus what is known by us with certainty must also be necessary in itself; for things which in themselves are contingent futures we cannot know with certainty. But the things which are known by God, it is enough that they are necessary for the necessity of their presence under the gaze of divine science, as we have said, but it is not required that they be so in them -even when we consider them in their causes. Consequently, this proposition: “Everything that God knows is necessarily”, we are accustomed to distinguishing it. It can relate to the thing she is talking about, or to the saying. If we understand it from the thing, the proposition is taken in a divided sense, and it is false; for this means: Everything that God knows is necessary. But it can also be understood by saying. Then the proposition is taken in a compound sense, and it is true; for this means: that saying, “a thing known by God to be” is necessary.
But some object to this that this distinction has its place when it comes to forms separable from their subject. If, for example, I say: “What is white can be black”, this proposition, false as regards the saying, is true as regards the thing, because the thing which is white can be black, whereas this assertion “What is white is black”, can never be true. But, when it comes to forms inseparable from their subject, the distinction, assert these authors, is not appropriate; for if I say, for example: “the black crow can be white,” the proposition is false in both senses. Now, that a thing is known by God is an inseparable attribute of that thing; for what is known by God cannot in any way be unknown to him. In truth, this instance would be inadmissible if being known by God included some inherent disposition in the subject. But, since this only involves being the object of an act of the knower, to the thing on itself, although it is always known, something can be attributed which suits it according to what it is. in itself, and which does not suit it as it is the object of the act of knowing. Thus material being is attributed to the stone as it is in itself, whereas it cannot be attributed to it insofar as it is an intelligible object.
Article 14 — Does God know our utterances?
Objections:
1 . It does not seem so, because knowing statements suits our mind insofar as it composes two concepts together or separates them from one another. But in divine intelligence there is no composition.
2 . All knowledge is made by means of a similarity. But in God there is no similarity, since God is absolutely simple.
On the contrary , we read in Psalm (94, 11): “God knows the thoughts of men. “Now in the thoughts of men there are utterances. So God knows this one.
Answer:
Since forming utterances is in the power of our intelligence, and since God knows everything that is in his own power or in the power of his creature, as was said previously, it is a necessity that God knows all the utterances that can be formed. Only, just as he knows material things immaterially and things simply composed, God knows utterances, not by uttering himself as if there were in his mind the composition or division which characterizes the utterance, but he knows everything by a simple intuition, penetrating through it the essence of each thing. It is as if, by apprehending the essence of man, we thereby knew all the predicates that can be attributed to man. This does not happen in the case of our intellect, which passes from one term to another because the intelligible form represents one term in such a way that it does not represent another. Also, in knowing the essence of man, we do not thereby know the other attributes of man, but successively. Because of which the formal reasons that we know apart from each other, we must bring them back to unity by composition or division, by forming statements. But the intelligible form of the divine intellect, which is its essence, is sufficient to manifest everything. By knowing his essence, God therefore knows the essences of all things, and everything that can happen to them.
Solutions:
1 . The proposed objection would only have value if God knew utterances by enunciative mode.
2 . The composition in the enunciation signifies some being of the thing; it is thus that God, by his being, which is his essence, is the similarity of all the modes of being which are signified.
Article 15 - Is the science of God subject to change?
Objections:
1 . It seems so. Because science is relative to the thing known. Now, what implies relationship with the creature is attributed to God temporally and varies according to the variations of the creature. Therefore the knowledge of God itself varies according to the variations of the creature.
2 . Whatever God can do, he can know. But God can do more things than he does. He can therefore know more things than he knows, and thus his knowledge can vary by increase or decrease.
3 . God once knew that Christ would be born. But now he does not know that Christ will be born, since Christ is no longer to be born. So God does not know everything he has known, and so his knowledge seems to be variable.
In the opposite sense , it is said in the epistle of St. James (1,17): in God “there is no vicissitude, nor shadow of change”.
Answer:
According to our previous determinations, the knowledge of God is his very substance. As its substance is absolutely immutable, as we have also shown, it is necessary that its science be entirely invariable.
Solutions:
1. Appellations of God as Lord, Creator, etc. imply relationships following acts conceived as having as their end the creatures according to the being they have in themselves. Therefore such relationships are attributed to God in changing ways, according to the changes of creatures. But science, love, etc. imply relationships following acts conceived as immanent in God, and this is why these attributes are applied to God in an invariable manner.
2. God also knows the things he can do and does not do. Consequently, from the fact that he can do things that he does not do, we cannot conclude that he can know more things than he knows, unless we understand it from his own science of vision, by which it is said to know the things which are in act at any moment of duration. However, whether God knows that things are possible which are not, or that things which are might not be, it does not follow that his knowledge is variable, but only that he knows the variability of things. If, however, something were, of which God was at first unaware that it was and then knew it, his knowledge would be subject to variation. But this cannot be; for God, in his eternity, knows everything that is or can be in any time. Also, to say of a thing that it exists at any moment in time is to say that it has been known by God from eternity. Consequently, we must not concede that God can know more things than he knows, because this proposition implies that God would have been ignorant at first of what he would have known afterwards.
3.The ancient nominalists said that “Christ is born”, “Christ will be born”, “Christ is born”, are the same statement, for this reason that the thing stated is the same, namely the birth of Christ. From this we conclude that everything God has known, he knows; for he now knows that Christ is born, which, hypothetically, has the same meaning as: He will be born. But this opinion is false. Firstly because diversity in the terms of a proposition gives rise to diverse utterances. Then because, in this case, a proposition true once would always be true, which is rightly denied by the Philosopher, according to whom this proposition: “Socrates is seated”, is true as long as he is seated, but if Socrates rises, the proposition becomes false. We must therefore concede that this proposition: Everything that God has known, he knows, is not true as a statement. But it does not follow that the knowledge of God is variable. For just as no variation is introduced into the knowledge of God from the fact that he knows of one and the same thing, sometimes that it is, and sometimes that it is not, so it is without any variation of divine science that God knows of a statement sometimes that it is true, sometimes that it is false. There would be variation in the science of God if God knew the statements by mode of enunciation, namely by composing and dividing concepts, as our own intellect does. This is why our knowledge varies, whether from true to false, as when, something having changed, we retain the old opinion regarding it; or from one opinion to another opinion, as if, having first said that someone is seated, we then say that he is not. But none of this can happen in God.
Art 16 - Does God have speculative knowledge of things, or practical knowledge?
Objection:
1. It seems that God does not have speculative knowledge of things, because God's knowledge is the cause of things, as has been shown. But a speculative science of things is not the cause of known things. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.
2. Speculative knowledge is obtained by abstraction from concrete things, which does not suit the science of God. Therefore the knowledge of God is not speculative.
On the contrary , what is nobler must be attributed to God. But speculative science is nobler than practical science, as the Philosopher shows at the beginning of the Metaphysics. Therefore God has speculative knowledge of things.
Answer :
There is a kind of science which is only speculative; another which is only practical; a third finally which is speculative in one aspect, and practical in another. To understand this, you must know that a science can be said to be speculative in three ways. First, because of the things of which it is the science, and which are not achievable by the one who knows: thus the knowledge that man has of the things of nature or of God. Secondly, because of the way of knowing, like an architect who studies a house by defining it, classifying it and considering its general characteristics. To proceed in this way is to study feasible things in a speculative manner and not as they are to be realized, because a thing is done by the application of a form to a matter, not by the analytical reduction of the compound into its universal principles. Third, because of the end pursued, because, says Aristotle, “the practical intellect differs from the speculative intellect in finality.” Indeed, the speculative intellect is the consideration of truth. Therefore, if an architect asks about a house how it might be built, not in order to build it, but simply to know, it will be, as far as the aim pursued is concerned, a speculative inquiry, although it concerns an operation. Therefore knowledge which is speculative because of the thing known is only speculative; that which is speculative as to the mode or as to the end is partly speculative and partly practical; and, when it is ordered to carry out that which is the end of the operation, only practical.
Consequently , it must be said that God has only speculative knowledge of himself, because he himself is not something capable of being produced. But of everything else he has both speculative and practical knowledge. Speculative, no doubt, as to the mode of knowing, because everything that we conceive speculatively, by defining and distinguishing concepts, God knows in an infinitely more perfect way.
As for the things which he can do, but does not actually cause to be at any time, God does not have practical knowledge of them according to the fact that knowledge is called practical because of its finality; he has, in this sense, a practical knowledge of the things he causes to be. As for evils, although they are not achievable by him, they nevertheless fall, like good things, under his practical knowledge, insofar as God allows them, prevents them, or reduces them to order. . This is how diseases are an object of practical knowledge for the doctor, insofar as, through his art, he treats them.
Solutions:
l.The knowledge of God is the cause not of himself, but of other things: some in action are those which are realized at any moment of time; others virtually are those which he has the power to do, but which are never done.
2. Drawing science from things known does not suit speculative science as such, but by accident, insofar as it is human.
As for the objection To the contrary, it must be answered this way. There is no perfect science of achievable things if they are not known as achievable. Also, since God's science is perfect in every way, God must know feasible things as feasible, not just as speculatively knowable. However, the nobility of speculative science is not taken away from him, because he sees all things other than himself, and it is speculatively that he knows himself. Thus, in his speculative knowledge of himself, he has both speculative and practical knowledge of all other things.