The Summa of Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas volume 1
1. Is there a will among the angels?
2. Is the will of the angel identical to his nature, or also to his intelligence?
3. Do angels have free will?
4. Do the irascible and the concupiscible exist in them?
Article 1 - Is there a will among angels?
Objections:
1. According to the Philosopher, “the will is in reason.” Now there is no reason among angels, but something superior to it. There is therefore, among the angels, not a will, but a faculty superior to the will.
2 . The will comes from the appetite, according to Aristotle, and the appetite supposes an imperfection since its object is what we do not possess. Now angels, especially blessed angels, have no imperfection. It therefore seems that there is no will in them.
3 . According to Aristotle again, the will is a moving engine; in fact it is moved by the desirable object when it falls under the apprehension of the intelligence. But the angels are immobile because they are incorporeal.
In the opposite sense , S. Augustine teaches that the image of the Trinity is found in the spirit, insofar as there is memory, intelligence and will in it. This image of God does not only exist in the human mind, but also in the angelic mind, because the angelic mind is capable of God. So there is a will in the angel.
Answer :
It is necessary to admit that angels have a will. All creatures, in fact, proceed from the divine will and are inclined to good by appetite, each in its own way and variously. Some are inclined to good only by the disposition of their nature, without there being any knowledge on their part; such as plants and inanimate bodies. This inclination is called “natural appetite”. Others are inclined to good with a certain knowledge, not that they grasp the very reason for good, but they only know a good determined in its particularity: thus the sense which knows the soft, the white, etc. The inclination that arises from this knowledge is called “sensible appetite.” Finally, other creatures are inclined to good with a knowledge which allows them to apprehend the very reason for good, which is the property of intelligence. Such beings are inclined towards good in the most perfect way, because they are not only pushed towards it in some way by another, as happens with beings devoid of knowledge; they are not only inclined to a good in its particularity, like beings endowed with sensitive knowledge; but they are inclined towards the universal good itself. And this inclination is called “will”. This is why, since the angels apprehend by their intelligence the universal reason of good, it is manifest that there is a will in them.
Solutions:
1. It is not in the same way that reason is superior to sense, and intelligence to reason. Reason transcends sense because of the diversity of known objects; because sense has as its object the particular, and reason the universal. Hence comes the necessity of a double appetite; one tends to the universal good and is required by reason; the other is directed towards the particular good and is demanded by meaning. But intelligence and reason differ only in their mode of knowledge; intelligence knows by simple intuition; reason knows by reasoning. Which does not prevent reason from succeeding in knowing, through reasoning, what intelligence knows by intuition, namely the universal. It is therefore the same object which is proposed to the appetitive faculty, either by reason or by intelligence. It follows that angels, who are purely intellectual creatures, do not have an appetite greater than the will.
2 . Although the word “appetite” etymologically comes from the word appetere, which means to desire what one does not have, the appetitive faculty extends to many other objects. Thus the word lapis, stone comes from laesio pedis, wound of the foot, and has a much broader meaning. Likewise, the word irascibile takes its origin from ira, anger; but irascible power includes hope, audacity and many other passions as well as anger.
3. The will is called a moved motor in the sense that the movement can be applied to the act of willing and intellection. In this sense, we can speak of movement in the angel, because, says Aristotle, such movement is none other than the act of the perfect being.
Article 2 - Is the will of the angel identical to his nature or his intelligence
Objections:
1. It seems that among angels the will does not differ from intelligence and nature. Indeed, the angel is a simpler being than the natural body. But the latter is inclined by its very form towards its end which is its good. Even more so, it seems, will be the case with the angel. Now the form of the angel can only be the nature in which he subsists, or the species which is found in his intelligence. It is therefore through one or the other that the angel will be inclined to good. And since this ordination to good is part of his will, it cannot be anything other than nature or intelligence.
2 . The object of intelligence is truth; and that of the will is good. But truth and good do not really differ; there is only a distinction of reason between them. Will and intelligence therefore do not really differ.
3 . The distinction between the common object and the proper object does not diversify the powers, because the same power of sight has as its object color and whiteness. But good and truth have the same relationship between them as the common object and the proper object, because truth is a particular good since it is that of intelligence. The will, whose object is good, therefore does not differ from intelligence, whose object is truth.
On the contrary , the will of angels is only directed towards good. Intelligence relates to good and evil, because the angels know both. The angel's will is therefore other than his intelligence.
Answer :
Will, among angels, is a faculty or power which is neither identified with their nature nor with their intelligence. With their nature first, because the nature or essence of a thing is intrinsic to it; and everything that is extrinsic to it cannot be identified with essence. We see clearly that, in natural bodies, what tends to be is not something superadded to the essence, it is either matter, which desires to be before possessing it; or the form, which maintains the thing in being, once this thing is constituted. But the inclination towards what is extrinsic always presupposes something superadded to the essence; thus the tendency towards the proper place is made by means of gravity or lightness, qualities extrinsic to the essence; the inclination to produce a being similar to oneself is realized by means of active qualities. But the will has a natural inclination to good. There will therefore only be identity between essence and will in the case where the totality of good is contained in the essence of the willing subject. This is the case with God, who wants nothing outside of himself except because of his goodness. But the same cannot be said of any creature, for infinite good is outside the essence of every created being. This is why the will of the angel, no more than that of any other creature, cannot be identified with its essence.
Likewise, whether it is an angel or a man, there can be no identification between intelligence and will. Knowledge, in fact, supposes that the known is in the knower; it therefore implies, for intelligence, that what is extrinsic to it by its essence is able in some way to exist in it. The will, on the contrary, moves towards what is outside it by a certain inclination which makes it tend towards external reality. It is therefore necessary that, in every creature, intelligence is other than will. In God, it is not so, because God possesses in himself the universal being and the universal good, and it follows that his will, as well as his intelligence, is identical to his essence.
Solutions:
1 . The natural body, by its substantial form, inclines towards its own being. But, to tend towards an external reality, it needs something added, as we have just said.
2 . The powers diversify according to the distinction, not material, but formal, of their objects. This is why the distinction between the formal reason of good and the formal reason of truth is sufficient to establish that of intelligence and will.
3 . Good and truth are convertible in reality, and this is why good can be apprehended by the intelligence under the reason of truth, and truth under the reason of good by the will. This is enough to distinguish the two powers.
Article 3 – Do angels have free will?
Objections:
1. The act of free will consists in choice or election. But there can be no election in the angels; this in fact is an appetite which focuses on what has been deliberated beforehand, and deliberation is a search, according to Aristotle: but if the angels know it is without having to search, since it is reasoning that highlights the research. There is therefore no free will in the angel.
2 . Free will presupposes the possibility of an alternative. But there is no alternative in angelic knowledge; because the angel cannot make a mistake in the domain of natural realities. as we said. His affectivity itself cannot therefore be free in its choice.
3 . What is natural among angels suits them to different degrees since the intellectual nature (which is common to them all) is more perfect in the higher angels than in the lower angels. But free will does not have degrees: there is therefore no free will among angels.
On the contrary , freedom of choice belongs to human dignity. Now the dignity of the angel is higher than that of man. Even more so, freedom of choice must be found in the angel.
Answer:
There are beings who do not act by choice, but who are acted and moved by others, like the arrow launched towards a goal by the archer. Other beings act by a certain choice, but which is not free, such as animals without reason; thus the sheep flees the wolf because, in a certain way, it judges and considers that the wolf is harmful to it; but this judgment, in her, is not free; it is innate to her by nature. Only he who possesses intelligence can act by free judgment, because he knows the universal reason for good, and, from there, he can judge whether this or that is good. This is why, in every being where there is intelligence, there is also free will. Free will is therefore found in the angel, and in a more excellent manner than in man, as is the case with intelligence.
Solutions:
1. Aristotle, in the passage referred to here, speaks only of human election. Now we know that the appreciation of man, in speculative things, differs from that of the angel; the first involves research; the second goes without it. It is the same in the field of action. Certainly, in the angels, there is choice or election; but the angel has no need of the deliberative seeking of counsel; the immediate grasp of the truth is enough for him.
2. As we have said, knowledge supposes that the known is in the knower; and it is imperfect for a thing not to possess what it is fitted, by nature, to possess. The angel would therefore not be perfect in nature if his intelligence was not in possession of all the truths that he can naturally know. But, through the act of the appetitive power, affectivity finds itself inclined towards external reality. Now, the perfection of a being does not depend on all the realities towards which it is inclined, but only on the higher realities which can perfect it. It is therefore not being imperfect for the angel to not have a determined will towards the realities which are inferior to him; On the contrary, it would be one to be indeterminate with regard to what is above it.
3. Free will, like judgment, is nobler in the angel than in man. However, it remains true that freedom itself, insofar as it is an absence of coercion, does not entail anything more or less. This is the case with any deprivation or any negation; they do not contain degrees in themselves, but only in relation to their cause, or insofar as an affirmation is attached to them.
Article 4 — Do the irascible and the concupiscible exist among angels?
Objection:
1. Dionysius speaks of “the senseless fury of demons and their mad lust.” But demons are of the same nature as angels, since sin has not changed their nature. The irascible and the concupiscible therefore exist among the angels.
2. Love and joy belong to the concupiscible; anger, hope and fear are irascible. Now, Scripture attributes these passions to angels.
3 . Certain virtues, such as charity and temperance, seem to belong to the concupiscible; others, like hope and strength, to the irascible. But these virtues are found in angels. There is therefore in them the concupiscible and the irascible.
In the opposite sense , as Aristotle affirms, the irascible and the concupiscible belong to the sensitive part of the soul. But there is no sensitivity among angels.
Answer :
It is not the intellectual appetite, but only the sensitive appetite, which is divided into irascible and concupiscible. The reason is that powers are distinguished not by their material objects but by their formal object. If a faculty has as its object a formality common to several materially distinct objects, there is no reason to distinguish several faculties according to the plurality of objects included in this formality which is common to them. Thus the proper object of sight is is color as such; we therefore do not distinguish between several powers of seeing depending on whether the object of vision is white or black. But if the proper object of a faculty was white as such, we would have to distinguish this power from that which has black as its object.
Now, from all that we have said, it is manifest that the object of the intellectual appetite or will, is good under the common reason of good. We will therefore not divide the intellectual appetite according to the particular goods it covets. But it will be quite different for the sensitive appetite which, precisely, has a particular good as its object. In the angels, there is only the intellectual appetite, we will therefore not distinguish it into irascible and concupiscible, but we will leave it indivisible, and we will give it the name of will.
Solutions:
1. Fury and lust are attributed to demons by metaphor. This is how we sometimes speak of the wrath of God because of the effect produced which resembles that of wrath.
2 . Love and joy, considered as passions, belong to the concupiscible; but, when they simply designate an act of the will, they belong to the intellectual part; thus to love is to want good for someone, and joy is the rest of the will in the good possessed. When it comes to the angel, there is never a question of attributing to him love and joy as passions, says St. Augustine.
3. Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible, but in the will. For the object of the concupiscible is the good pleasing to the senses; such is not the divine good which is the object of charity. For the same reason, hope is not in the irascible, because the object of the irascible is the good difficult to obtain in the sensible order; and the virtue of hope has as its object the good considered difficult to acquire but which is the divine good. As for temperance, considered as a human virtue, it governs the desire for sensitive delights, which belong to the concupiscible. Likewise, strength governs the daring and fears found in the irascible. This is why temperance, a human virtue, resides in the concupiscible, and strength in the irascible. In this sense, they do not exist in the angel who does not know the passions of desire, fear and audacity, and who does not have to regulate them by temperance and force. But we can speak of temperance among angels in that they measure and regulate their will according to the divine will; and we can speak of strength about them, when they firmly execute the wills of God. All this is done by means of the will, and not by the irascible and the concupiscible.