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The Summa of Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas volume 1

QUESTION 66 — THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CREATION AND DISTINCTION

1. Did a formless state of created matter precede in time the distinction of this matter? -
2. Is there only one matter for all corporeal beings? -
3. Was the empyrean sky created with formless matter? -
4. Was time created with her?

Article 1 - Did a formless state of created matter precede in time its distinction?

Objections:

1.
It seems that an unformed state of matter preceded its formation in time. It is said in fact in Genesis (1,2): "The earth was desert and empty" or, according to another version, "invisible and uncomposed"; according to S. Augustine, this designates a formless state of matter. At a certain moment, before being formed, matter would therefore have been formless.

2 . In its operation nature imitates the operation of God, as the second cause imitates the first cause. Now, in the operation of nature, the formless state precedes formation. This therefore also applies to the divine operation.

3 . Matter is above accident. Because matter is part of substance. But God can make an accident without cause. This is evident in the sacrament of the altar. God can therefore make matter formless.

In the opposite direction ,

1 . The imperfection of an effect attests to the imperfection of the agent. But God is the perfect agent par excellence. Hence the words of Deuteronomy (32:4): “The works of God are perfect.” The work created by God has therefore never been formless.

2 . The formation of the corporeal creature was produced by the work of distinction. But distinction is opposed to confusion, like formation in the formless state. Therefore, if the formless state had preceded in time the formation of matter, it would follow that in the beginning there would have been a confusion of the corporeal creature, what the ancients had called Chaos.

Answer:

On this problem, the Fathers had different opinions. S. Augustine wants that the formless state of matter did not temporally precede its formation; there would have been anteriority only according to the origin or the order of nature. Others, like S. Basil, S. Ambroise and S. John Chrysostom, want the formless state of matter to have preceded its formation. Although these opinions seem contrary, they differ only slightly. S. Augustine in fact understands the expression “formless state” of matter differently than the others.

According to S. Augustine, in the formless state of matter, we must see the absence of any form. And from this point of view it is impossible to say that the formless state of matter preceded temporally either the formation of this matter or its distinction. This is obvious for training. Indeed, if formless matter had preceded by duration, it would already have existed in action; because the act is implied by duration; the term of creation is in fact being in action. Now, that very thing which is in act is the form. Therefore, to affirm that there was first matter without form is to say that a being in act was without act, which is contradictory. - We cannot say either that matter had a sort of common form, and that afterwards various forms were added by which it found itself distinguished. For this would return to the opinion of the ancient naturalists, who supposed that the first matter was an actual body, for example fire, air or water, or some intermediary; from which it resulted that substantial becoming was none other than alteration. For, this prior form giving actual being in the category of substance, and causing there to be such an existing being, it would follow that the superadded form would not absolutely cause actual being, but being according to such an act, which is the property of the accidental form. In this way, subsequent forms would be accidents, where we do not observe generation but alteration. It must therefore be said that the raw material was neither created without any form, nor created in a single common form, but was created in distinct forms. - Therefore, if the expression "formless state of matter" refers to the condition of first matter (which as such does not have any form), it must be recognized that such a state did not temporally precede the formation or distinction of matter, as St. Augustine says, but only by origin or by nature, in the manner in which the power is prior to the act, and the part to the whole.

The other Fathers, on the contrary, use the expression "formless state" not as excluding all form, but as excluding that beauty and brilliance which we now see in the corporeal creature. And in this sense they affirm that the formless state of bodily matter has, over time, preceded its formation. Taking things this way, S. Augustine is, in part, in agreement with them; but for another part, it does not follow them, as we will see later.

According to what we want to draw from the letter of Genesis, three species of beauty were missing, and this is why the corporeal creature was called "formless". First of all, the beauty of light was missing from the entirety of this diaphanous body that we call sky, hence this sentence: “Darkness covered the abyss.” On the other hand, the earth lacked a double beauty: the first is to be free of water; and it is in this sense that it is said: "The earth was desert" or "invisible", because it could not be seen as it is because of the waters which covered it on all sides. The second beauty is that which it draws from vegetables and plants; and that is why it is said that it was "empty" or, according to the other version, "unorganized". Thus, having put at the head of his story the creation of two natures, heaven and earth, the sacred author expresses the formless state of heaven by saying: "Darkness covered the abyss", as under the word "sky", air is included; and he states the formless state of the earth in the words: "The earth was desert and empty."

Solutions:

1
. In this passage, the word "earth" is understood differently by S. Augustine and by the other Fathers. S. Augustine wants in fact that here the names “earth” and “water” designate the raw material itself. Indeed, as Moses was addressing an uneducated people, it was not possible for him to signify the raw material other than by analogies drawn from well-known things. This is also why he designates this matter by several analogies, by not using the single word "water" or the single word "earth", so that we do not imagine that it was in reality or the earth, or water. However, the raw material presents with the earth this resemblance of being underlying the forms, and with the water, of being able to be informed by various forms. In this sense therefore the earth is called "deserted and empty" or "invisible and unorganized", because matter is known by the form (therefore considered in itself it is said to be invisible or deserted); and its power is fulfilled by form; hence Plato says that matter is a “place”. - The other Fathers understand by earth the element itself; we explained above how, according to them, it was formless.

2. Nature produces the actual effect from potential being. It is therefore necessary that in its operation the power temporally precedes the act, and that the formless state is prior to formation. But God produces being in act from nothing; he can therefore instantly produce a perfect reality according to the magnitude of his power.

3 . The accident, since it is form, is of the act; on the contrary, matter, as such,is to be in potential. Being in act is therefore more contrary to matter without form than to an accident without subject.

Solutions to objections to the contrary:

1 . If, according to the doctrine of the other Fathers, the "formless state" temporally precedes the formation of matter, this comes not from God's impotence but from his wisdom. He intends to observe an order in the establishment of things by leading them from the imperfect state to the perfect state.

2 . Some of the ancient physicists supposed a confusion excluding any distinction; except the reservation made by Anaxagoras of a single distinct and unmixed intellect. On the other hand, Scripture sets out, prior to the work of distinction, various distinctions.

- 1 . That of heaven and earth, which manifests a distinction also valid on the plane of matter, as we will see later; it is found in the words: "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."

- 2 . The distinction of elements as to their shapes.

It is made when water and earth are named. If Scripture makes no allusion to either air or fire, it is because it was not obvious to the uneducated men to whom Moses addressed that there were bodies of this kind, such as This is evident in the case of land and water. Plato, however, understood that air was signified by the expression "breath of the Lord", because air is also called "breath". As for fire, he saw it signified by the sky, which he said was of an igneous nature, as reported by S. Augustine. Maimonides, who agrees with Plato for the rest, affirms for his part that fire is signified by "darkness", for this reason he says, that in the sphere which is proper to it fire does not shine. It seems more in keeping with reality to repeat what was said above, because the expression "breath of the Lord" is usually used in Scripture only when it refers to the Holy Spirit. And when it is said that he hovers over the waters, this is to be understood not in a bodily way but as the will of a master craftsman dominates the matter he intends to inform.

- 3 . the distinction according to the local situation. The earth was under the waters which made it invisible; and the air, which is the subject of darkness, is indicated as above the waters by these words: "Darkness was on the face of the deep." - What remained to be distinguished, what follows will show us.

Article 2 - Is there a single matter for all corporeal beings?

Objections:

1.
It seems that for all bodies there is one and only formless matter. S. Augustine says in fact: "I see two things that you made: one which was formed, and the other which was formless." Then he specifies that the latter is the "invisible and unadorned earth", which, he asserts, means the matter of corporeal realities. There is therefore a single matter for all corporeal things.

2 . Aristotle tells us that realities which are one by genus are one by matter. Now all corporeal things are found in the genus body. There is therefore a single matter for all corporeal beings.

3 . There is diversity of act in different powers, and unity when the power is unique. Now there is a unique form for all bodies, which is corporeality. So there is a unique subject for everyone.

4 . Considered in itself, matter only exists potentially. But the distinction comes from the shapes. Therefore, if we consider it in itself, there is only one matter for all bodily realities.

On the contrary , all things which have matter in common are transmutable among themselves and play the roles of agent and patient for each other, says Aristotle. However, celestial bodies and lower bodies do not have this mutual behavior. They therefore do not have a single subject.

Answer:

On this problem the opinions of philosophers have differed. Plato and all philosophers before Aristotle assumed that all bodies had the nature of the four elements. Since the four elements communicate in the same matter, as their mutual generation and destruction show us, it followed consequently that there was a single matter for all bodies. As for the fact that certain bodies are indestructible, Plato attributed it, not to a condition of matter, but to the will of the author, that is to say of God, whom he presents thus speaking to the celestial bodies : “By your nature you are susceptible to dissolution, but by my will you are exempt from dissolution, because my will is superior to the knot which constitutes you.”

Aristotle refutes this position by invoking the natural movement of bodies. The celestial body is endowed with a natural movement different from the natural movement of the elements; it therefore follows that its nature is other than that of the four elements. And as the circular movement which is specific to celestial bodies does not experience contrariety, the movements of the elements being contrary to each other (such as ascending or descending movement), the celestial body is similarly without contrariety, while the elementary bodies involve contrariety. Thus, since generation and destruction occur between opposites, it follows that according to its nature the celestial body is incorruptible, while the elements are corruptible.

Despite this difference from natural corruptibility and incorruptibility, Avicebron considering the unity of the bodily form, assumed a single matter for all bodies. But if there were a single essential form as a form of corporeality, a form to which other forms would be added which would preside over the distinction of bodies, we would be in the necessity that we have just stated. Because this form would inhere immutably in matter. Consequently, from the point of view of this form, any body would be incorruptible, and its corruption would only occur through the rejection of subsequent forms; which would not be an absolute corruption but a relative one, because a certain being in action would remain underlying the corruption. The same thing happened to the ancient physicists when they supposed as the subject of bodies an active being, like fire, air or another of the same kind.

On the other hand, if we suppose that there is no form in the corruptible body which remains as the substrate of generation and corruption, it necessarily follows that it is not the same matter which is found in bodies according to whether they are corruptible or incorruptible. Indeed, matter, as such, is potentially form. It is therefore necessary that matter, considered in itself, be in potentiality with the forms of all the things of which it is the common matter. On the other hand, matter only becomes in act through a form in relation to this form. Matter therefore remains in potential for all other forms. - This is not excluded if one of these forms is more perfect and contains within itself in its potentialities the other forms; because power, as such, has an indifferent behavior with regard to the perfect and the imperfect. Consequently, when it is in an imperfect form, it is potentially in a perfect form, and vice versa. Therefore, matter insofar as it is in the form of an incorruptible body still potentially remains in the form of a corruptible body. And since it does not have this form in action, it will find itself simultaneously subject to form and deprivation; the lack of a form in what is potential for the form being deprivation. But this disposition is the fact of the corruptible body. It is therefore impossible by nature for the incorruptible body and the corruptible body to have the same and unique matter.

However, it is not necessary to say, as Averroes imagined, that the celestial body is itself the matter of the sky, a being in potential for a local situation and not for substantial existence, its form then being the separate substance which is united to it as a motor. Indeed, we cannot affirm that something is an actual being if it is not itself entirely act and form, or if it does not possess act or form. If we discard by the mind this separate substance which is posited as the motor, and if the celestial body is not that which possesses the form (that is to say a being composed of the form and the subject of form), it follows that it is entirely form and act. But every being of this kind is an intelligence in action, which cannot be said of the celestial body, since it is perceptible to the senses.

It therefore remains that the matter of the celestial body considered in itself is not potentially in any form other than that which it possesses. And it does not matter to us what this form may be, soul or anything else. In any hypothesis, this form perfects this matter so well that in no way does there remain in it any potential for substantial existence, but only in place, says Aristotle. Therefore, it is not the same matter that exists in the celestial bodies and in the elements, except by analogy, insofar as these things are unified in the notion of power.

Solutions:

1.
S. Augustine follows the opinion of Plato who did not suppose a “quinte essence”. It may also be answered that formless matter is one according to a unity of order, as all bodies are one in the order of the corporeal creature.

2. If we consider the genus from the physical point of view, corruptible beings and incorruptible beings are not in the same genus, because of the different modalities that power takes in them, according to Aristotle. But from the logical point of view there is a single gender for all bodies, because of a single reason of corporeality.

3. The form of corporeality is not one in all bodies, because, as we have said, it does not differ from the forms by which bodies are distinguished

4. Since power is said in relation to the act , the being in potential diversifies by the very fact that it is ordered to various acts; thus sight to color, and hearing to sound. Consequently, the matter of the celestial body is other than the matter of the elements by the fact that it is not potentially in their forms.

Article 3 - Was the empyrean sky created with formless matter?

Objections:

1.
If the empyrean sky is anything, it must be a sensitive body. Now every sensitive body is subject to movement. But the empyrean sky is not in this case, because its movement would be perceived by the movement of some apparent body; which we are not at all aware of. The empyrean sky is therefore not something that was created with formless matter.

2. S. Augustine says that "the lower bodies are governed according to a certain order by the higher bodies." If the empyrean sky were some kind of supreme body, it would therefore have to have a certain influence on the lower bodies of this world. Which does not seem to happen, especially if we present it as free of movement; for no body can be the cause of movement if it is not itself the subject of movement. The empyrean sky is therefore not created with formless matter.

3. If we say that the empyrean sky is the place of contemplation, not ordered to natural effects, S. Augustine says In the opposite sense "To the extent that our mind grasps something eternal, we are no longer in this world." From which it appears that contemplation elevates our mind above corporeal things. There is therefore no bodily place assigned to contemplation.

4.Among the celestial bodies, there is a body which is partly diaphanous and partly luminous: the “sidereal sky”. There is also a completely transparent sky, which some call "watery" or "crystalline" sky. If there is another sky above, it must therefore be completely luminous. But this cannot be, for then the air would be continually illuminated and there would never be night. There is therefore no empyrean sky created with formless matter.

In the opposite sense , Strabo says that in these words: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth", the sky means not a visible firmament, but empyrean, that is to say fire.

Answer:

The existence of the empyrean sky is only proposed by the authorities of Strabo and Bede, and furthermore by that of S. Basil. By affirming this fact, these authors agree on one point: this heaven is the place of the blessed. In fact Strabo, and Bede with him, tells us: "As soon as it was done, it was filled by the angels." And in the same sense S. Basil specifies: "Just as the damned are driven into the ultimate darkness, so the reward for meritorious works is allocated in this light which is outside the world, where the blessed receive the share of the sojourn rest." These authors, however, differ on the reason which suggests the existence of this sky. For Strabo and Bede, the hypothesis of the empyrean sky rests on this argument that the firmament (word by which they understand the empyrean sky) is not said to have been made in the beginning, but on the second day. S. Basil for his part gives the reason that God must not seem to have purely and simply begun his work from darkness, which was one of the blasphemous lies of the Manichaeans, since they called god of darkness the God of Old Testament.

All these reasons do not have much force. The question of the firmament, which we read in Scripture was made on the second day, is in fact resolved in a different way by S. Augustine and by the other Fathers. As for the question of darkness, it is resolved, for the first, in that the formless state which darkness signifies preceded the formation not by duration but by origin. For the other Fathers, darkness not being a creature but a deprivation of light, divine wisdom is manifested in that the beings it produced from nothing were first instituted by it in a state of imperfection, and then were subsequently brought to perfection.

We can find a more satisfactory reason starting from the very condition of glory. We indeed expect a double glory in the reward to come: spiritual and corporal; and then not only will human bodies be glorified, but the whole world will be renewed. Now, spiritual glory began from the beginning of the world in the beatitude of the angels, a beatitude the like of which is promised to the saints. It was therefore fitting that from the beginning bodily glory should also be inaugurated in a body preserved from the beginning from the bondage of corruption and change, and endowed with complete luminosity, in accordance with that which the entire corporeal creature expects to become after the resurrection. And this is why this sky is called empyrean, that is to say of fire, not because it burns, but because it shines.

You should know that, according to S. Augustine, Porphyry "distinguished the angels from the demons by the fact that the places of the air belonged to the demons, and those of the ether or the empyrean to the angels". But let us note that Porphyry, as a Platonist, believed that this sidereal sky was made of fire. So he called it “empyrean”; or even "ethereal", insofar as the word ether is taken from the conflagration, and not, as Aristotle says, from the rapidity of the movement. We recall this to prevent the belief that St. Augustine understood the empyrean sky in the modern sense.

Solutions:

1.
Sensitive bodies are subjects of movement according to the very status of the world. For it is the movement of the corporeal creature which brings about the multiplication of the elements. But, in the final consummation of glory, the movement of bodies will find its end. And yet this must have been the arrangement of the empyrean sky from the beginning.

2. There is some probability, as some think, that the empyrean sky, being ordered to the state of glory, has no influence on the lower bodies, which belong to another order, that of the course natural things. However the following position seems to be even more likely. Just as the highest angels, who are with God, have an influence over the angels of intermediate and lowest dignity, who are "sent" (although, according to Dionysius, they themselves are not "sent"); similarly, the empyrean sky has an influence on bodies subject to movement, although it is not itself subject to movement. Thus we can say that it causes in the first heaven subject to movement, not some passing reality occurring through a movement, but something fixed and permanent, like the power to contain or to cause, or something else of this nature. gender, which is appropriate to his dignity.

3.A bodily place is assigned to contemplation for a reason not of necessity but of convenience, so that an exterior clarity is in harmony with the interior clarity. Hence the words of S. Basil: “The servant spirits could not live in darkness: it was in full spiritual light and joy that they found the state that suited them.”

4. “It is manifest,” says St. Basil, “that the sky, closed on its own circumference, formed of an opaque and solid matter, could separate the interior from the exterior. It was therefore necessary for it to obscure the place it isolated, the external light breaking on it." - But because this body of the firmament, although solid, is diaphanous, which does not prevent light (experience proves it, since we can see the light of the stars, without the intermediate skies obstructing it), for this reason it could still be said that the empyrean sky does not have a condensed light which emits rays, like the body of the sun, but a light of a more subtle nature. - Finally another answer is still possible: the empyrean sky has the clarity of the state of glory, which is not of the same species as natural clarity.

Article 4 - Was time created with formless matter?

Objections:

1.
It seems not. S. Augustine, addressing God, says in fact: "I find two things that you have made foreign to time: corporeal matter and angelic nature." Time is therefore not created with matter.

2. Time is divided into day and night. But in the beginning there was neither day nor night; this only appeared later, when "God divided the light from the darkness." So time did not exist from the beginning.

3. Time is the number that measures the movement of the firmament. Now we read in Scripture that this one was created on the second day. Time therefore does not exist from the beginning.

4. Motion is prior to time. It is therefore he, rather than time, which was to be numbered among the first created beings.

5. Time is an extrinsic measure; likewise the place. No more than the place we must therefore count time among the number of the first created beings.

On the contrary , S. Augustine said that the creature, both spiritual and corporeal, was created "at the beginning of time."

Answer :

It is commonly said that there were four things that were created first: angelic nature, the empyrean sky, formless corporeal matter, and time. But we must be careful that this way of speaking does not arise from the opinion of St. Augustine. This in fact posits two creatures made first: angelic nature and corporeal matter. It makes no mention of the empyrean sky. Now, these two realities, of angelic nature and of formless matter, precede the formation not in duration but by nature. And as they by nature precede formation, so they are also prior to both movement and time. We cannot therefore include time in this enumeration.

This comes from the opinion of the other Fathers, for whom the formless state of matter had, over time, preceded formation. Because of this duration, it was therefore necessary to set aside some time. Otherwise there could be no measurement of duration.

Solutions:

1.
S. Augustine says this in the sense that angelic nature and formless matter precede time in the order of origin or nature.

2. According to the other Fathers, matter was in a certain way without form, then it was formed. Likewise time was in a certain way formless, then subsequently formed and distinguished into day and night.

3. If the movement of the firmament did not begin from the beginning, then the time which preceded was not the number of the movement of the firmament, but of all first movement. Indeed, time happens to be the number of the movement of the firmament to the extent that this movement is the first of the movements. But if there were another primary movement, it is of this movement that time would be the measure. For everything that is measured is by reference to the first of its kind. On the other hand, it must be said that from the beginning there was a certain movement, if only through a succession of ideas and affections in the angelic spirit. However, we cannot conceive of movement without time, because time is nothing other than “the number of before and after in movement”.

4. Among the first created beings are those who have a general relationship with things. We must therefore count time there, since it has a common measurement value. But this does not apply to movement, which relates only to the subject it affects.

5. The place is to be understood in the empyrean sky, which contains everything. And since place is one of the permanent realities, it is created simultaneously in its entirety. But time, which is not a permanent thing, was only originally created in its principle. This is how even now nothing can be considered as time in action, apart from the present moment.

Let us study the work of distinction next: I. The work of the first day (Q. 67). -II. The work of the second day (Q. 68). -III. The work of the third day (Q. 69).